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ABSTRACT
This study sought to examine the interrelationship of 
cognition and language in the clinical syndrome of depres­
sion. It was proposed that the types of cognitive differen­
ces in depression proposed by Beck and other cognitive 
theorists would be reflected in language usage, and especial­
ly in syntax. Using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), 
subjects were classified as either depressed (BDI >_ 16) or 
non-depressed (BDI <_ 4). Subjects were asked to speak into a 
tape recorder for 3-5 minutes on each of three stimuli, a 
positive event, a negative event, and a neutral opinion 
stimulus. The language samples were then analyzed using the 
Syntactic Language Computer Analysis program (SLCA-III) which 
generated 36 variables from the samples. From the ANOVAS done 
on the 36 variables, 6 hypothesized differences between de­
pressed and non-depressed subjects were found to be signifi­
cant. Depressed persons used greater frequencies of (a) 
intransitive verbs and the passive voice; (b) state of being 
verbs; (c) negated information units (nouns); and (d) un­
sensed (abstract) nouns. Non-depressed persons were found to 
use greater numbers of qualifiers in general and to use more 
non-negated qualifiers in specific. A forward stepwise dis­
criminant function analysis used state of being verbs, 
negated nouns, and unsensed (abstract) nouns to correctly 




This study proposes to examine the interrelationship 
of cognition, language, and maladaptive behavior; and in 
particular, the clinical syndrome known as depression. To 
adequately explore each of these areas, a brief theoretical 
overview will be presented. It is proposed that some portion 
of maladaptive behavior, particularly in depression, is 
maintained by the encoding of experience into an analog of 
behavior governed by rules for information processing and 
decision making commonly referred to as cognition, and that 
language is the primary medium through which this encoding 
occurs and is maintained.
A summary of the assertions on which this study is based 
will first be considered. The literature relevant to these 
assertions will be presented in the subsequent sections.
These assertions are the following:
1) Cognition is a set of processes used to store experience 
as information resulting in an analog or model of experience 
that functions as a guide for future behavior (Goldstein & 
Blackman, 1978; Palmer & Kimchi, 1986; Williams, Watts, 
Macleod, & Mathews, 1988).
2) Cognition, while composed of three media or modes,
reaches its most effective, complex, and subtle form in the 
symbolic mode, of which language is the best representative 
(Bruner, 1964).
3) While language is studied in a wide variety of ways, 
including the analysis of semantics, syntax, and pragmatics; 
(Morris, 1946), the focus of this study will be the analysis 
of certain features of language syntax, because of the cur­
rent availability of reliable computer methods for analysis 
and measurement.
4) Maladaptive or pathological behavior, while admittedly 
multidetermined, can be conceived of as being partly the 
result of a "faulty" or inadequate cognitive model (Beck; 
1979, 1967, 1963: Bandura; 1980: Derry & Kuiper; 1981, 1980: 
Epstein;1986 : Mandler;1985 ) .
5) The syndrome of depression is a particular subset of 
maladaptive behavior for which a number of explanations or 
theories has been presented (Akiskal & McKinney, 1975). A 
number of these theories rely heavily on cognitive processes 
as central mediators in the formation and maintanence of 
depression
6) Therefore, if language and syntax serve as a primary 
medium through which the cognitive analog is built, stored, 
and manipulated, and if depressive symptoms include cogni­
tive distortion, then differences in the use of language and 
in syntax, should be found between depressed and non- 
depressed persons.
The remainder of this introductory chapter will examine 
each of these assertions in greater detail and will cite the
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relevant literature that supports them and, where appro­
priate, some alternate viewpoints and positions. For certain 
of the topics, enlarged discussions will be found in noted 
appendices.
Cognition
Cognition and the place of symbolic processes within the 
study of human behavior have consistently presented a diffi­
cult task to the science of psychology (Baars,1986;
Mandler,1985). While early psychologists were concerned with 
the description of consciousness through the process of 
introspection, the arrival of behaviorism changed the focus 
of study to events that were observable, objectively verifi­
able, and corresponded to environmental cues (Baars, 1986; 
Mandler,1985; Murphy & Kovach,1972). Mentalistic concepts 
such as motivation, purpose, intention, and cognition were 
thought to be of secondary importance. At the extreme these 
cognitive domains were thought to follow behavior rather 
than to control or mediate it. Thus, behaviorism in its 
strictest form, posits a simple Stimulus-Response (S-R) or 
non-mediational model as an explanation of human behavior.
While the behavioral approach has the advantage of 
simplicity, it cannot adequately explain behavior that is 
elicited quite separate, spatially and temporally, from the 
conditions thought to be necessary to elicit it. Additional­
ly, whole classes of interesting and experimentally replica­
ble phenomena such as hypnosis, altered states of conscious­
ness, and dissociation; could not be accounted for in strict­
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ly behavioral terms (Hilgard;1980,1977 ) . These deficiencies 
in a simple S-R model lead to the development of a viewpoint 
that can be summarized as the Stimulus-Organism-Response (S- 
O-R) or the mediational models. In these approaches the 0 
represents some form of mediational processes that intervene 
between the stimulus conditions and the behavioral response. 
While this approach has a great deal of empirical and 
theoretical support, the problem for psychology and, for that 
matter, for the developing discipline of cognitive science 
(Sharkey, 1986; Mandler;1985), is in the specification of 
precisely what these mediating processes do, how they de­
velop, and how they function in the determination of beha­
vior .
It is at this point in the developmental history of 
psychological theory that the study of such constructs as 
cognition were reintroduced (Baars, 1986). The study of 
cognition, then, became the attempt to specify how organismic 
mediational processes influence behavior; how they are 
learned or develop; how they are maintained and encoded; how 
sensitive they are to change; and what is necessary to change 
them.
To examine cognition properly some form of definition is 
necessary. While such definitions abound (Garfield, 1990) 
a working definition is that cognition is the process by 
which environmental information is acquired, stored, and 
manipulated. In addition cognition encompasses the process 
of decision making based on that acquired information.
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Mandler (1985) referred to these functions as "representation 
and processes". Walker (1978) referred to cognition as "the 
study of the principles by which intelligent entities in­
teract with their environment". Sharkey (1986) defined cog­
nitive science as the "study of possible cognitive archi­
tectures (including representation and rules) and processes 
involved in understanding various parts of the world, inclu­
ding ourselves." (p.14)
The importance of the information processing and deci­
sion making function of the organism is the heart of the S-O- 
R approach. The organism responds to stimuli on the basis 
of its own cognitive structure or its own decision rules and 
less to the stimuli themselves. Thus, within the organism a 
representation is created of the varying antecedent and con­
sequent stimuli. This representation is then used in the 
guidance of behavior. That such cognitive structures can and 
do influence outward behavior is by no means a new concept. 
Meichenbaum (1977), in an overview of the development of 
cognitive behavior therapy, quoted such philosophers as 
Epictetus, Kant, and Adler who, each in his own way, has 
commented on the relationship between cognition, emotion, and 
behavior. Mahoney (1977) stated that an organism responds to 
its cognitive construction of the environment rather than to 
objective reality. Goldstein and Blackman (1978) stated 
that cognitive style is the hypothetical construct that at­
tempts to explain the process of mediation between stimuli 
and response. They reasoned that cognitive style refers to 
the way that an individual characteristically conceptualizes,
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organizes and interprets information about the environment. 
Bieri (1979) stated that individuals learn strategies, pro­
grams, and other processes to transform objective stimuli 
into meaningful dimensions. Also, Zajonc (1980) defined cog­
nition as an active process whereby information is organized, 
processed, and mediates between the individual and the en­
vironment. Zajonc further stated that such an organization of 
information also affects the organism's behavior. Cantor and 
Kihlstrom (1981) stated that "the operative factors in human 
behavior were not the objective stimulus conditions, but the 
ways in which situations were perceived and the meanings 
attributed to them by the individual." This "led investiga­
tors to take seriously the cognitive processes by which the 
individual construes situations and plans behavior in a 
psychological environment." (p. xi)
If cognition or cognitive structures have such an im­
pact on behavior, then what exactly is such a cognitive 
structure? How is it formed and what is the relationship 
between cognitions and the environmental events that they 
represent?
The meta-explanation of cognition is that it is an 
analog or model of the environment and corresponds in a 
mathematical, representational, or analogical way to the ex­
ternal environment. Such a view is proposed by a number of 
theorists including Bandler and Grinder (1975), Garfield 
1990), Jaynes (1976), Mandler (1985), Minsky (1986), and 
Williams, et al.(1988). For a more detailed discussion of
7
this process of representation or modeling of experience 
through analogs in cognition and some of the implications for 
human consciousness, refer to Appendix A.
While the meta models of cognition as an analog or map 
of experience provide for an overview of the function of 
cognition, they are clearly too broad for practical utility. 
They can provide clues as to the function of cognition in 
the guidance of behavior, but they do not provide guidelines 
for prediction or a way of altering maladaptive (or 
mistaken) behaviors. Minsky (1986) made note of this 
problem of specification when he states, " To explain the 
mind we have to show how minds are built from mindless 
stuff, from parts that are much smaller and simpler than 
anything we'd consider smart. Unless we can explain the mind 
in terms of things that have no thoughts or feelings of 
their own, we'll have only gone around in a circle."(p. 18)
For this reason, the analysis of cognition must be 
broken down into smaller units. Once such a reduction of the 
scope of cognition is undertaken, literally hundreds of sub 
areas can be identified, including: memory, information pro­
cessing, sensory perception, concept formation, attitude 
formation, computational abilities, logic, decision rules, 
and problem solving, to name just a few. For this paper, the 
focus of the discussion will be on the role that language 
plays in cognition as it is involved in individuals with 
disordered behavior, particularly depression. I will use as 




When examining cognitive models from a behavioral per­
spective, Mahoney identified three types. The first model 
he called the covert conditioning approach. According to 
this view, cognitive events are covert forms of overt 
phenomena. Basically, this view extends the more classical 
principles of learning and conditioning to apply to the 
covert events of cognition. Through learning principles, 
internal states become representations of external stimuli, 
consequences, and responses, so that the organism responds to 
internal events as it does to more observable external phe­
nomena .
The second general model described by Mahoney is the
information processing model. He states,
As the name implies, the information proces­
sing model places emphasis on the acquisi­
tion, storage and utilization of information. 
Although stimulus input and performance 
output are still employed as anchors, the 
information processing viewpoint invokes very 
different mediators in relating these two 
events. Rather than positing covert stimulus 
response mechanisms, it borrows structural 
and functional features from several other 
disciplines. Cybernetic theory, linguistics, 
perception and computer analogs are generous 
contributors to the information processing 
model, (p.125)
The third model described by Mahoney is a synthesis of 
the other two. It is called the cognitive learning model and 
it is composed of theoretical positions and hypotheses of 
many different thinkers. Consequently, the definition of just 
what a cognitive learning model entails will vary with the
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user of this model. Mahoney describes this approach in this 
way.
Man is viewed as a complex organism capable 
of impressive adaptation. He is in continu­
ous reciprocity relationship with his envi­
ronment, a relationship which might be analo­
gized as a cybernetic feedback loop. Behavior 
changes are influenced by the current physio­
logical state of the organism, his past lear­
ning history and a variety of interdependent 
cognitive processes (e.g. selective atten­
tion, anticipated consequences, etc.)
(p.145).
The three models described by Mahoney are best viewed 
as a second level of analysis in the examination of 
cognition; more precise than the meta-models refered to 
earlier but still dealing with general processes. The task 
at the next level of analysis is the specification of the 
nature and function of discrete cognitive processes, the 
circumstances under which they operate, what they consist 
of, and how they are interrelated with observable behavior. 
The focus of this paper is a small example of just such a 
specification. It will briefly examine how cognition is 
functionally related to language and how language provides 
the informational field upon which human information 
processing depends. Further, cognition will be examined as it 
relates to the syndrome of depression, as will the role that 
language plays in the maintanence of depression.
Mechanisms of Cognition
As has been suggested here and discussed in greater 
detail in Appendix A , the overall function of cogni­
tion is to serve as a model of or a processor of experience
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and can be likened to mechanical processors of information. 
The next step in the analysis is to specify the mechanisms 
and/or algorithms by which human cognition operates in the 
processing of experience. Such a specification begins with 
what is called thinking.
Bruner (1964) stated that thinking occurs in three pri­
mary modes. The first of these modes is called the enactive 
mode whereby information is stored as muscle sensations, 
motor responses, and/or visceral sensations. The second mode 
is called iconic representation, where images from the 
senses, primarily visual and/or auditory senses, form the 
substance of thought. These are the visual pictures and 
remembered sounds and they can become quite vivid and 
complex. The third mode is called the symbolic mode and is 
in fact an extension of the iconic mode. Here, remembered 
auditory images, words, become symbolic representations of 
other forms of experience.
While each of these three modes is interrelated and 
information is represented, stored and transferred, from all 
three, the symbolic mode is the most complex and subtle. Ac­
cording to such theorists as Jaynes (1976), Luria (1961), 
and Vygotsky (1961), the complexity and subtlety of the 
symbolic form results in a number of uniquely human 
properties. Luria and Jaynes went so far as to suggest that 
human consciousness of self is a direct result of our 
linguistic-symbolic thought processes and that the full 
development of self consciousness depends on them.
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Jaynes presented an intricate theory of the growth and 
development of human cognition that is based on the process 
of the metaphor. Through a constant process of comparing 
familiar, understood items with less understood ones, a rich 
cognitive field is built up. The familiar item becomes an 
analog for the unfamiliar and the new item can then serve as 
an analog for an even newer one. Through the countless 
associations of attributes of both analog and phenomenon, 
extremely complex networks of comparison and understanding 
are formed. Thus, according to Jaynes, linguistic and cogni­
tive development is a reciprocal process in which longer and 
longer associative chains are formed between symbols and 
experience. This process becomes so automatic that we no 
longer see the metaphorical nature of much of our everyday 
speech, such as; "head of the family", "foot of the bed", 
etc. or how many of our words are metaphors from other 
languages. Jaynes (1976) summarized by stating.
Subjective conscious mind is an analog of 
what is called the real world. It is built up 
with a vocabulary or lexical field whose 
terms are all metaphors or analogs of beha­
vior in the physical world. Its reality is of 
the same order as mathematics. It allows us 
to shortcut behavioral processes and arrive 
at adequate decisions. Like mathematics it is 
an operator rather than a thing or reposito­
ry. And it is intimately bound up with voli­
tion and decision, (p.55)
For a more extensive discussion of Jaynes' conception 




Jaynes' theory is a complex one and it touches on what 
has been a controversial area in the study of human thought; 
the interrelationship of cognition and language. Essentially, 
there are two positions concerning the relationship between 
cognition and language. The first position states that 
language and thought are related in some way and parallel one 
another, but that each is in reality separate and distinct. 
According to this view, a thought is formed and is then put 
into words. Chomsky's (1972,1959) conceptions of "deep" and 
"surface" structures represent one form of this point of 
view.
The other position concerning the relationship of lan­
guage to thought is that embodied in the Whorf-Sapir hypo­
thesis of linguistic relativity. This position, as des­
cribed by Sapir (1921), states that the language community 
into which a person is placed has profound implications for 
his perceptions of the world around him. The language 
structure and habits that one learns determine one's view of 
the world and one's cognitions. Basically, this view is that 
language is. thought. Jaynes' position, at least relative to 
the particular form of thought called consciousness, is that 
it depends on language and is based upon it, and thus 
consciousness developed later in human evolution than had 
been previously supposed.
The most extreme form of linguistic relativity is cal­
led the "mold theory" (Carroll, 1958). This theory states 
that the structure of one's native language sets limits on
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and determines the cognitions of the speaker. In a more mo­
derate position, the "lattice theory", (Carroll,1958) stated 
that the structure of one's native language provides a frame­
work for cognition with considerable latitude within that 
framework for individual difference based on experience.
This hypothesis of linguistic relativity is generally 
considered to suggest that there are cognitive differences 
between speakers of different languages. However ,Vetter 
(1969) suggested that, at the level of the idiolect. the 
individuals unique usage or dialect, individualized differen­
ces in learned language patterns can also reflect individual 
cognitive differences. Cummings and Renshaw (1979) built upon 
this view when they stated, "We believe that language can 
best be viewed systematically as interdependent with percep­
tion and cognition, as a symbolic identifier or marker of 
discriminable elements and their relations perceived to exist 
in the real or imaginary environment of a living organism. It 
may be that language behavior is best conceived as a baro­
meter of experience." (p. 291)
Cognitive Development and Language
The area of cognitive development in children is a 
complex one and far beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
a brief overview of a number of different viewpoints is 
needed to show the interrelationships of cognitive develop­
ment to language.
Not surprisingly, conceptual differences exist to ex­
plain cognitive development. For example, theorists such as
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Piaget (1968), Sinclair (1970), and Slobin (1973) argued that 
language acquisition is dependent on cognitive maturation 
which results from a person's physical maturation. However, 
theorists such as Vygotsky (1961), Luria (1976), Bruner 
(1964) and Sokolov (1972), asserted that language acquisition 
is a necessary condition for cognitive development. They 
believed that the linguistic environment of the child is a 
significant factor in the development of the child's sub­
sequent cognitive processes. Of these researchers Luria's 
position is the most extreme. He stated that language and 
speech are central mediators in all higher mental processes.
Piaget stated that children first go through a period 
where their ianguage is egocentric, then language is social 
or interactional, and finally, language becomes internalized 
as thought. Vygotsky, somewhat differently, described the 
developmental process by which children learn to control 
their overt behavior as the process of speech mediation. He 
noted that the motor activities of the child first come 
under the control of spoken directions from others, notably 
parents. Secondly, these motor activities come to be 
controlled by the child speaking to himself, and, finally, 
these self instructions are overlearned and internalized as 
thought. Luria (1976), in discussing the work of Vygotsky 
stated,
Language, which mediates human perception, 
results in extremely complex operations; the 
analysis and synthesis of incoming informa­
tion, the perceptual ordering of the world 
and the encoding of impressions into systems.
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Thus words -- the basic linguistic units -- 
carry not only meaning but also the fundamen­
tal units of consciousness reflecting the 
external world, (p.9)
Later in the same work, he said,
Thus the formation of complex forms of the 
reflection of reality and activity goes hand 
in hand with radical changes in the mental 
processes that affect these forms of reflec­
tion and underlie activity. Vygotsky called 
this thesis the semantic and system structure 
of consciousness, (p.11)
This view is similar to that expressed by Jaynes, dis­
cussed earlier. Thus, consolidating these positions; human 
cognition and even consciousness result from a process by 
which motor functions and visceral sensory information be­
come associated with and under the control of the speech 
directives of others. The child then learns to control and 
monitor his/her own behavior through self vocalizations and 
external speech. Subsequently, self instructions become 
learned and internalized, resulting in an almost automa­
tic response and what is called thought. The self directive 
or self instructional aspects of this process have been of 
significant interest in the development of cognitive theories 
of psychopathology identified by Meichenbaum (1977, 1974,). 
The work of Meichenbaum has been used to assist clients in 
cognitive restructuring through changes in linguistically 
based maladaptive self-instructions.
Language
This paper is an attempt to study the processes of 
cognition and how they relate to disordered behavior, parti-
16
cularly depression. The discussion to this point has begun 
with a macro-analysis of cognition, in general and is pro­
ceeding in increments to a micro-analysis of the contents 
and processes of cognition, specifically linguistic proper­
ties. At this point, it is necessary to examine some of 
the ways that language itself is studied and conceptualized. 
For an extended discussion of some of the approaches to 
linguistic analysis refer to Appendix B. For the discussion 
at this point all that is necessary is reference to Morris' 
(1946) description of three modes of linguistic analysis. The 
first mode is semantics. the study of the meaning of words 
and the relationships of words as symbols to the referents 
they represent. The second mode is syntactics. the struc­
ture of the language or the classes of symbols and the way 
in which they relate to one another. The third mode is 
pragmatics. the relationship between the symbols or the 
symbolic process and the uses to which they are put. Pragma­
tics relates to the application and use of language symbols.
Like many classification systems used for the analysis 
of phenomena, Morris' taxonomy is somewhat arbitrary and its 
utility is one of convenience and ease of conceptualization.
As such an arbitrary distinction, the boundaries of each 
classification are unclear and blend into one another. In 
fact, Bates (1976) said "that as syntactics are derived 
ontogenetically from semantics so are semantics derived 
ontogenetically from pragmatics." (p.354)
Both semantics and pragmatics are discussed in more 
detail in Appendix B. Of relevance to the discussion at this
17
point is the area of syntactics, the area that serves as the
focus of this study.
According to Lyons (1968), syntax is the way in which 
words combine to form sentences. Commonly, syntax is thought 
of as the rules of grammar. However, the main premise of 
this paper is that syntax is much more: that by structuring 
and ordering language, syntax structures and orders thought.
While a complete history of syntactic analysis, like 
many other topics mentioned here, would prove far too com­
prehensive for this paper, it is important to understand 
that the initial purpose for the study of syntax was 
philosophical, not merely linguistic. To the Greeks, the 
study of syntax was an attempt to classify thought. It
began with simple subjects and predicates (the topics of
thought or content, and statements about that content) and 
developed into the classification of the familiar parts of 
speech we use today. However, each part of speech had a 
specific function in thinking. Nouns, verbs, and adjectives 
were each thought to deal with a specific attribute of 
thought. It was only during the Middle Ages that syntax was 
applied to the study of literature and was relegated to the 
simple grammatical approach that we think of today.
The viewpoint that syntax is a determinant of
thought is not without support. Brown (1957) stated:
In recent years the anthropologists Whorf 
(1956), Lee (1938) and Hoijer (1954) have put 
forward the view that language is a determi­
nant of perception and thought. The nature
of the determining influence exerted by the 
vocabulary of a language is clear, but it is
18
less easy to see how the grammatical features 
of a language can affect cognition. Yet it is 
just the grammatical differences between 
languages that are most striking and it is 
their determining force that the anthropolo­
gist has stressed. This paper undertakes to 
show how one kind of grammatical practice, 
the allocation of words to one or another 
part of speech does affect cognition, (p.l)
In taking such a stance. Brown shows once again that 
the artificial separation of linguistic phenomena into the 
three classes of semantics, pragmatics, and syntactics is an 
arbitrary one. The classes chosen, the parts of speech, have 
semantic meanings of a larger order associated with them.
They define classes of cognition. Nouns have characteristic 
properties of representing persons, places, or things, 
verbs represent relationships or actions of some form, and 
adjectives and adverbs represent some form of qualifier or 
description of characteristics. Cummings and Renshaw 
(1979), interpreting grammatical categories in light of 
Gaito's (1964) information extraction model of cognition and 
perception, have stated, "Thus, language behavior is a 
reflector of the information units of our perception 
(nouns), together with cognated relations between information 
units (verbs), and the quality-quantity of both information 
units (adjectives) and relations (adverbs)." (p.293)
While these classifications of parts of speech are 
generally accepted, there are many exceptions. The "thing" 
quality of a noun such as "book" is clear; but what of a 
noun such as "beauty"? Brown (1957) took note of these 
abstractions and examined the nature of noun usage in chil­
dren. He found that younger children’s usage of nouns more
19
nearly matched the grammatical definition. The nouns that
they used were more likely to be "concrete". However, older
children and adults used more "abstract" nouns. He made the
point that linguistic familiarity with the supposed function
of a noun was carried over so that such concepts as beauty,
truth, and the like behave in cognition as things precisely
because of their grammatical classification. Brown stated:
While the part of speech membership of a 
word does not give away the particular 
meaning, it does suggest the general type of 
that meaning, whether action, object, 
substance or whatever. . . .  It now seems 
quite probable that speakers of other lan­
guages will also know about the semantics of 
their grammatical categories. Since these 
are strikingly different in unrelated langua­
ges, the speakers in question may have quite 
different cognitive categories. It remains 
to be determined how seriously and how gene­
rally thought is affected by these semantic 
distinctions, (p. 5)
It is precisely these nuances of syntactic usage and 
their relationship to "meta" semantic features in cognition 
that form the principle tenet of this paper. The specific 
form of an utterance carries with it a particular set of 
syntactic nuances which forms a cognitive "envelop" that 
conveys both the larger meaning and the cognitive subtleties 
associated with the specific form. In this light, Chomsky's 
assertion that utterances differ in "surface structure" and 
yet represent the same cognition in "deep structure" is 
misleading. Viewed from the perspective of syntactic 
nuance, the main concept of an utterance might be the same 
but the implications of the cognitive envelop might vary 
considerably. For a single utterance, the difference might
20
be insignificant. But what of a large number of utterances? 
Could two different speakers discuss the same topic, convey 
very similar cognitions, and yet, because of consistently 
different syntax, imply very different world views?
If it is found that syntactic differences do, in fact, 
represent real differences in cognition, then the implica­
tions for cognitive classification are considerable. For 
example, personality classification systems based on syntac­
tic categories might prove to be more reliable than current 
taxonomic or diagnostic systems. Secondly, syntactic analy­
sis might prove to be a better diagnostic procedure than 
current tests, or, at least a useful adjunct. Third, if 
syntax conveys a good deal of cognition, then instruction in 
alternate syntactic usage might prove useful as an adjunct 
to therapy.
Language. and Psychopathology
That language behavior might be a significant factor in 
cognition and psychopathological conditions is not a new 
idea. At least from the early part of this century 
(Southard, 1916) researchers have examined linguistic 
patterns in a wide variety of psychological or psychiatric 
conditions. For a review of some of the relevant historical 
literature refer to Appendix C.
Cognition and Depression 
While the main tenet of this study is concerned with 
the analysis of the relationship of language to cognitive 
processes and how cognition affects behavior, the focus of
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these concerns must be narrowed. For this reason, therefore, 
a particular mode of maladaptive behavior, depression, will 
be examined. Since depression is an example of behavior 
about which much is known, this paper will focus on the 
relationship between depression (as a cognitive state) and 
the specific linguistic behavior of syntax usage as a 
representation of the larger concern of linguistic behavior, 
cognition, and maladaptive behavior in general.
Depression has been chosen for this paper because of 
the seriousness and epidemic nature of this syndrome and for 
the fact that many researchers have offered a large number 
of theoretical positions that propose disordered cognitions 
as a major etiological factor in depression.
For a review of the major theories of depression and the 
extensive nature of the syndrome see Appendix D.
While listed as an affective disorder, depression as a 
diagnostic classification clearly indicates that behavioral 
and cognitive elements are involved. Depression is viewed 
as a multimodal phenomenon, involving or resulting from 
disturbance in affect, cognition, and overt behavior. Boyd 
and Levis (1980) have stated that manifestations of depres­
sion are seen at the emotional, cognitive, motivational, 
physical, and behavioral levels. A summary definition of 
depression might be that it is characterized by a predomi­
nant affective state of sadness or guilt and is accompanied 
by cognitive distortions relating to lessened self-esteem 
and competency; and as such it leads to a decrease in overt
reinforcing behavior and a person's general level of activi­
ty. While this definition is not exhaustive, it suggests 
the complexity of the syndrome and serves as a framework for 
our understanding of the psychological state of depression.
Cognitive Theory of Depression; Beck and Seligman
Although depression is classified as an affective dis­
order, it is clear that much of the subjective discomfort of 
depression results from the perceptions and beliefs of the 
individual. This distinguishes depression from simple sad­
ness . While the emotional state identified as sadness seems 
to result from a perception of loss, depression has been 
identified as a continuing state of sadness with a concom- 
mitant distortion of cognition that maintains this sadness. 
This cognitive component in depression is the underlying 
factor of the psychopathological state, as defined by both 
Beck (1963) and Seligman (1974) as well as such other 
theorists as Frankl (1969), Bart (1974), Abraham (1911, cited 
by Akiskal & McKinney, 1975) and Bibring (1965) discussed in 
Appendix D. According to each of these theorists, some flaw 
or disorder in the cognitive process, (or the cognitive 
analog to use terms presented by Jaynes and discussed in 
Appendix A.) of the person, developed from whatever source 
and in whatever manner, maintains the emotional state of 
depression.
Presently, the most comprehensive system for explaining 
cognition and the psychopathological state of depression is 
that of Beck (1963). Beck identified specific deviations of
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thought in depressed individuals which lead to distortions 
of cognition and behavior. Beck described four major compo­
nents of depressive cognition. The first is low self re­
gard . Depressed persons are prone to grossly distort their 
perceptions of their attributes, abilities and qualities in 
a negative manner. Beck found that achievments were mini­
mized and failures were maximized. When comparing themselves 
to others, depressed individuals consistently regard them­
selves as inferior.
A second area of distortion is in ideas of deprivation. 
According to Beck, the depressed individuals believe 
themselves to be unloved, alone, or unwanted in spite of 
evidence to the contrary. This perceived deprivation applies 
to material possessions as well.
The third distorted area is self-blame or criticism. 
Depressed individuals will blame themselves or be highly 
critical of perceived shortcomings. This is distinguished 
from the general low self evaluation described earlier in 
that this criticism, while unrealistic, only applies to those 
attributes perceived as most important to the self image.
For example, a person who values himself as a father would be 
intensely critical of himself in this area, while being less 
concerned about himself as an athlete or employee.
The fourth area of cognitive distortion described by 
Beck is the magnification of problems and responsibilities. 
Tasks are blown out of proportion and appear overwhelming to 
the individuals when, in fact, they are often insignificant,
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even to the individuals themselves when not depressed.
Self commands are another significant area of distor­
tion in depressed individuals. These self commands often 
far exceed any realistic or practical capabilities of the 
individual, but they are referred to by the individual as
things that "should" or "must" be done. At this point, it is
useful to recall the concepts concerning the development of 
cognition proposed by Vygotsky and Meichenbaum discussed 
earlier (see Appendix A.). Both of these theorists stressed 
the importance of self commands in the development of cogni­
tion and in the control of behavior.
Related to such self commands are frequent thoughts 
about an escape from problem situations or unrealistic ex­
pectations, as in daydreams or even suicidal ideation. How­
ever, these fantasies generally produce no lasting relief 
and, when indulged even for brief respites, produce greater 
feelings of distress as the individual perceives the time
spent in this manner as wasted.
In addition to the four areas of distorted thematic 
content described above, Beck has classified the process of 
disordered thinking into what he calls types of error. The 
first type of error is called arbitrary interpretation.
Here errors of thinking result when a conclusion is made 
about an event where there is no factual evidence to support 
such a conclusion. Characteristically, these interpretations 
involve a negative evaluation of the individual.
A second type of error is called selective abstraction. 
Here a detail is taken out of context and then the entire
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event is interpreted on the basis of this detail. As in all 
of these types of error, the interpretation is made in the 
negative direction by the depressed individual. It is in­
teresting to note that this process of selective abstraction 
is similar to a process that Jaynes called excerption or 
the selective attention to some attributes of the stimulus 
field to the exclusion of others.
Magnification and minimization are also common types of 
errors that occur in the cognition of depressed individuals 
according to Beck. In these processes the aversive conse­
quences of an event are exaggerated far beyond the actual 
results. The pleasant aspects are ignored or minimized.
Inexact labeling is related to both overgeneralization 
and to the process of magnification. The depressed indivi­
dual uses words with a greater negative connotation than is 
necessary to describe an event and then reacts to the magni­
fied connotation.
Beck has also listed some characteristics of these 
cognitive distortions as they are perceived from the indivi­
dual's point of view. These distortions are seen as automa­
tic, involuntary and plausible. That is, they are perceived 
to occur automatically in a wide variety of situations, 
without recalled antecedents. They are perceived as not 
being under an individual's voluntary control and despite, 
their distorted, negative nature, these cognitions are be­
lieved by the individual to be realistic, plausible explana­
tions and evaluations of the person's life situation.
Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery (1979) refined this cogni­
tive model of depression and proposed three conceptual 
mechanisms to explain the psychological and cognitive pro­
cesses of depression. The first of these is the concept of 
the cognitive triad. This is a specific belief system in 
which depressed individuals view all aspects of life and 
themselves in a negative manner. These individuals see 
themselves as defective and inadequate and, due to these 
assumed defects, view themselves as undesirable and 
worthless. Thus, they tend to underestimate their personal 
qualities and to criticize and to hold themselves responsible 
for all failures. Secondly, the individual categorizes cur­
rent events and experiences to fit his negative expectations. 
In this manner they distort or exaggerate aversive events 
and ignore or deny positive ones. The third component of 
the cognitive triad is concerned with the depressed person's 
negative view of the future. In light of the first two 
beliefs, the individual anticipates continued deprivation and 
failure which, in turn, further fuels the depression.
The second set of cognitive mechanisms proposed by Beck 
et al. are schemas. These consist of relatively stable cog­
nitive patterns through which current experiences are inter­
preted. These schemas are learned patterns which become over­
generalized, so that subsequent situations are interpreted in 
a similar erroneous manner. These schemas, according to 
Beck, are proposed to dominate depressive thinking to the 
extent that the individual becomes unresponsive to environ­
mental changes.
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each model, there is room for a number of explanations as to 
just how the necessary negative cognitive set is formed.
Beck is most clear in describing his model as one that 
explains the phenomenon of depression, while allowing for 
multiple explanations as to just how these cognitive proces­
ses are started. Within his model, many of the causes 
proposed by other theorists (Abraham,1924; Frankl,1969;
Bart, 1974) can serve as starting points for the learned 
schemas and patterns that he suggests are the processes by 
which depression is developed. Beck addresses this issue by 
stat ing:
It should be emphasized that our explana­
tion up to this point is based on analysis of 
the phenomena of depression. Our observa­
tional tools at this level of analysis do not 
provide data regarding the ultimate 'cause'.
The patient's negative constructions of re­
ality can be postulated to be the first link 
in the chain of symptoms (or phenomena ) ....
Our formulation of the role of predisposing 
maladaptive cognitive structures is based 
partly upon long-term clinical observations 
as well as logical speculation. It does not 
seem plausible that aberrant cognitive mech­
anisms are created de. novo every time an 
individual experiences a depression. It ap­
pears more credible that he has some rela­
tively enduring anomaly in his psychological 
system. Thus we need to make our longitudi­
nal analysis in structural terms. A set of 
dysfunctional 'cognitive structures (Sche­
mas)' formed at an earlier time becomes acti­
vated when the depression is precipitated 
(whether by psychological stress, biochemical 
imbalance, hypothalamic stimulation or some 
other agent), (pp. 19-20).
According to the view proposed by Beck, these cognitive 
structures or schemas compose an intervening variable in the 
process of depression, and for the sake of treatment 
the system is entered at this level of intervention.
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However, from the viewpoint of examining the function of 
cognition itself, the model proposed by Beck deals with only 
part of the picture.
In order to properly examine Beck's cognitive theory, 
some additional framework for cognition is needed. Such a 
conceptual framework has been alluded to earlier but will 
now be more clearly specified. While the analysis of cogni­
tion can be undertaken at a number of levels,( Levanthal, 
1984; Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Sanford, 
1985; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Oatley & Johnson-Laird,
1987) a model consisting of four levels will be presented 
here. These four levels are by no means the only conceptu­
alizations possible nor are they strictly hierarchical in 
nature. Each level merges with the others and all have 
"loops" or referents in other levels.
The first level might be called the Meta or major 
functional level. At this level the primary utility of 
cognition as an explanatory variable is defined and studied. 
Examples of such functional definitions are the "analog" and 
"map" metaphoric models proposed by numerous authors. It 
is thought that the S-R and S-O-R models are appropriate for 
this level of analysis, whereby S-O-R models imply some 
functional utility for cognition and S-R models identify 
no such functional utility. This level of analysis allows 
for the study of concepts such as consciousness and beha­
vioral mediation. Therefore, this level permits a further 
analysis of cognition as a useful variable in the explana­
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tion of behavior. The utility of such a level of analysis 
is that it suggests the remaining levels and offers hypo­
theses for continuing study. For example, a "meta" model of 
cognition as a computer program suggests analysis at the 
remaining levels according to information theory, Boolean 
logic, decision theory, and game theory.
The second level I will term the Global or sub-func­
tional level. At this level of analysis, what are commonly 
referred to as cognitive structures are studied. The range 
of such structures is large and includes such concepts as 
id, ego, superego, the self, Beck’s schemas, Jaynes' analog 
I and metaphor me, and similar constructs. All of these 
constructs posit a function for cognition and propose struc­
tures and processes for the performance of that function.
The third level is the level of specific cognitive 
processes. These include the types of cognitions that occur 
in specific situations or within specific syndromes. Stu­
died here is attribution theory, perception, memory, and 
many social phenomena, as well as the types of specific 
cognitive errors proposed by Beck to describe depression.
The fourth level is not, in fact, a level in the hi­
erarchy, but is rather a focus for study of the events in 
all of the other levels. This level I will term the 
Para level and is concerned with the analysis of the media 
and processes of cognition itself. In information theory 
terms, this would be the analysis of the "carrier" rather 
than the "message". It is at this level that the study of 
syntactic properties in thought and language is most appro­
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priately described, although, as mentioned earlier, syntax 
does carry semantic or "message" properties.
These four levels provide a conceptual overview with 
which to undertake the analysis of cognition. Viewed in 
light of these levels, Beck's theory deals primarily with 
levels two and three. He postulates a function for cogni­
tion at the meta level and then goes on to describe struc­
tures at the global level, his schemas. At the third level, 
Beck specifies types of cognitive distortions involved in 
depression and he suggests methods for the alteration of 
these types of distortion.
Beck does not address the fourth level, the properties 
or medium of thought itself. In effect, he makes use of the 
symbolic process without focusing on the act of symboliza­
tion or on the properties of such a symbolic process. For 
his level of intervention, such a focus on the symbolic 
process itself is unnecessary, but for a complete understan­
ding of cognition such a focus is required. It is at this 
point that the threads of cognition in general, linguistic 
analysis, and the cognitive patterns of depression inter­
sect. Summarizing briefly, an individual uses a map or 
analog of experience, termed cognition, to interpret his/her 
environment and to mediate his/her actions. While such 
symbolizations of an analog can occur in the three modes 
described by Bruner, the most extensive, intricate, and 
subtle form of symbols are those encoded in language. If 
there is a maladaptive distortion in the cognitive analog,
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such a distortion should be visible in the encoded medium of 
thought, in this case, language. Thus, distortions in cogni­
tion should be reflected in linguistic usage and, con­
versely, distortions in linguistic usage will affect cogni­
tion.
Thus, condensing the terminology of a number of theo­
rists, depression, according to Seligman and Beck, is the 
perception of self as helpless, past experience as painful 
and the prospects for the future as likely to result in more 
of the same. Translated into Jaynes' terminology, the "ana­
log I" created by the individual is one where the behavioral 
options leading to pleasant outcomes are perceived as non­
existent, all of the actions and outcomes that affect the 
"metaphor me" are seen as negative, and the analog I is seen 
as powerless to alter the situation for the better. The 
narratization process weaves a life story where the analog I 
is both the victim and the culprit and the conciliation 
process between both the analog I and the metaphor me 
interprets all incoming information in light of this 
negative cognitive set or schema.
The present investigation attempts to study the 
correlation of a measure of depression of known clinical 
utility with measures of linguistic analysis. If cognition 
is interrelated with language, then, it is plausible that 
just such a correlation will be found, mirroring this 
relationship.
Cognition and Syntax: Syntactic Language Computer Analysis 
III. (SLCA-III)
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In an attempt to investigate language behavior and its 
relationship with cognition and the perceptual processes, 
and to provide a standard yet comprehensive format with an 
adequate theoretical foundation, Cummings and Renshaw (1971) 
developed what they called the Syntactic Language Computer 
Analysis (SLCA) program. A second version was developed in 
1976 and the current revision SLCA III was introduced in 
1978.
This latest version serves as the basic analytic tool 
of the present study. Incorporated into the theoretical 
background out of which this program was developed, are the 
conceptions of Whorf (1941, 1972), Vygotsky (1962), Skinner 
(1957), and Rapaport (1969), concerning the interrelationship 
of language, cognition, and perception. Cummings and 
Renshaw (1979) propose an axiomatic model of these relation­
ships where cognition is thought to vary directly and iso- 
morphically with language behavior.
Also used as a base for the development of SLCA-III is 
the information-extraction model of Gaito (1965), where it is 
proposed that information is drawn from the environment and 
forms the basis of cognition and perception. The standard 
grammatical parts of speech are interpreted in light of 
their relationship to types of environmental information.
As mentioned earlier, Cummings and Renshaw state that 
language is composed, therefore, of : A) information units of 
perception (nouns), B) cognated relationships between these 
units (verbs), and C) qualifiers of the properties and
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quantities of these units (adjectives) and relationships 
(adverbs).
The SLCA-III program categorizes language behavior and, 
by inference, cognition into eight classes or properties: A) 
Social perception, B) Sensation, C) Existence, D) Motion,
E) Disposition, F) Time, G) Reflexive Density and H) Defini- 
tionality. Also tabulated are relative densities or propor­
tions of information units (nouns), of relations (verbs), 
and qualifiers (adjectives and adverbs). These eight 
classes or qualities are further subdivided so that thirty- 
six variables are generated for each language sample. For a 
complete description of the SLCA variables and their 
dimensions see Appendix E. The eight classes defined by 
the SLCA-III program are clearly more than simple categories 
of parts of speech. They provide a theoretical underpinning 
for a comprehensive analysis of the function of cognition.
Cummings and Renshaw (1979) state, "These variables 
provide a basis for charting profiles of language users such 
that both molar and micro patterns may be identified as 
contributing to the understanding of the communication pro­
cess ."
Since the development of the second version of SLCA in 
1976 a great deal of research has been done comparing lan­
guage usage with such factors as age, sex, and educational 
level. In summarizing the studies that have been done using 
the SLCA program, Cummings and Renshaw noted that all eight 
categories were found to vary with age (Stich, 1978), Ma­
chiavellianism and power (Hazelton, 1977), physical distance
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(Garner, 1977), field dependence (Wright, 1976), sex 
(Parkinson and Gorcyca, 1977), lying (Chapman, 1976), and 
ego involvement (Pletsch, 1976). The SLCA program has been 
used also in the diagnosis of communication disorders.
Fields and Renshaw (1978) found that the categories of 
sensation, disposition, time, symmetry, and qualification 
were related to language delay. Jetty and Renshaw (1978) 
reported that social perception, sensation, and qualification 
were related with levels of hearing impairment. Edelman 
(1981) distinguished real vs simulated suicide notes using 
the SLCA program.
Present Study: Effects of Cognition as Measured by Language
(Syntax) in a Specific Psychological State (Depression)
The preceding discussion has served to outline the many 
threads of thought that must be interwoven to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the relation of linguistic usage, 
and cognition, and their relevance to the syndrome known as 
depression. From summarizing these viewpoints, equating 
their terminology, and integrating them, there emerges a 
theoretical synthesis.
Human cognition, consisting of three modes, as identi­
fied by Bruner (1964), results in a cognitive map or a 
world view or an analogical model of experience through a 
process of comparison and metaphor as described by Jaynes 
(1976). This model is built up or learned, subject to the 
principles of conditioning and learning, and serves as both
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a summary of and a symbol for past experience, and as a 
guide for future action. Through the use of this analog, 
history can be symbolized, recalled and used as a predictor; 
alternate interpretations can be reached, and options ana­
lyzed prior to action. Using the information processing 
metaphor, this cognitive analog stores and encodes environ­
mental and historical information, and contains the deci­
sion algorithms the organism uses to make judgements.
The symbolic mode of thinking exemplified most comple­
tely by language, allows cognition to reach its most com­
plex, versatile and subtle form. Similarly, according to 
Vygotsky, Luria, and Jaynes, the unique attributes of human 
consciousness, namely self-awareness, arise from this lin­
guistically based symbolic mode of thought. Relatedly, 
Jaynes describes two of what he considers to be the unique 
properties of human consciousness as the "analog I" , and 
the "metaphor me". With these two cognitive-linguistic 
structures, Jaynes describes the process of narritization 
whereby the history and experiences of an individual are 
integrated into a consistent whole, and used as the basis 
for further action. Thus, commonalities concerning cogni­
tion and language are found among a number of theorists.
In looking at the diverse theories concerning depres­
sion, a number of commonalities are also found. First, 
phenomenologically, the experience of depression seems to 
center around the individual1s negative perception of self 
and environment, and, usually, involves some form of dissa­
tisfaction with life as it is experienced. Secondly, what-
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ever the proposed etiology, distortions of perception and 
cognition constitute the bulk of the symptomatology in 
addition to depressed or flattened affect. Third, while the 
effects of depressed cognitions can be observed by others 
behaviorally in the form of lessened activity, lethargy, 
or expressions of despair, the pathology of depression is 
subjective and is defined by the cognitions, perceptions, 
and values of the afflicted individual. Translating this to 
the terminology of Jaynes, the subjective experience of 
depression is a function of the cognitive analog, specifi­
cally, distortions involving the "analog I" and the "meta­
phor me” . Those aspects of the individual's cognitive map 
that deal with self-concept and the perception of the envi­
ronment relative to the self are flawed and subject to 
misperception. That sadness is, of itself, not pathologi­
cal is well documented. This is demonstrated by the classi­
fication of reactive depression as a normal response to 
traumatic events. It is only when the reaction is prolonged 
or occurs in the presence of no objectively perceived crisis 
that the condition is thought to be psychopathological.
The situational precursors of prolonged depression have 
long been speculated upon. The earlier discussion of the 
various theories of depression makes this clear. However, 
with the exception of the biogenic theories and, to some 
degree, the conditioning models, theories concerning the 
precursors of depression have in common a distortion of 
cognition, particularly where it concerns the perception of
38
the self. Even the biogenic theorists recognize such a 
distortion although they hypothesize that this cognitive 
distortion follows a chemical disturbance.
While a number of researchers are interested in the 
effects of cognition on depression, as discussed earlier,
Beck has outlined most precisely the types of distortions 
likely to be present. Beck proposed a cognitive triad con­
sisting of: A) a negative view of the self or what, in 
Jaynes' terminology, would be a negative "analog I", B) a 
negative view of the world as it affects the self, the 
"metaphor me" of Jaynes, and C) a negative view of the future 
where both the analog I and metaphor me are subject to aver- 
sive events with no foreseeable relief.
The work of Vygotsky, Luria, Whorf, Sapir, and the 
others cited earlier postulates an intimate relationship 
between cognition and language. In an extreme form, cogni­
tion is thought to depend almost entirely on language.
While cognition in the iconic and enactive modes is possi­
ble, most self evaluations take the form of symbolic or 
linguistic thought.
If Beck's conceptions about the types of cognitions 
present in depression are valid and if syntactic use re­
flects cognition, then certain specific syntactic patterns 
should appear in the speech of depressed persons that can be 
distinguished from those of non-depressed persons. The 
SLCA-III program allows a comprehensive method of syntactic 
analysis. Thus, the hypotheses which this investigation 
will study propose to translate Beck's theory into the
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specific syntactic variables measured by SLCA-III.
The main hypothesis is a general one, reflecting the 
fact that this is a first step in the study of the relation­
ship of syntax to cognition in depression. Thus, it is
predicted that depressed individuals will differ from non­
depressed individuals in their use of syntax. Further, it
is predicted that the specific nature of these differences,
based on the types of cognitive distortions described by 
Beck et al. (1979), will be as follows:
1. Non-depressed persons will show a greater usage 
of qualifiers (adverbs and adjectives) than depressed 
persons suggesting a cognitive richness and variety with 
diverse descriptions and distinctions while depressed per­
sons will show lesser richness and diversity.
2. Depressed persons will have a greater usage of 
personal pronouns which reflects the depressed person’s 
preoccupation with the self.
3. Depressed persons will have a greater use of 
generalized other references. This hypothesis reflects the 
depressed person's greater cognitive vagueness and 
generalization.
4. Depressed persons will score higher in unsensed 
information than will non-depressed persons. This hypothesis 
reflects the depressed person's tendency to make vague 
statements which are less subject to objective verification. 
In other words, depressed persons will use more abstract
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nouns, adjectives, and adverbs which cannot be readily 
verified to contradict their existing cognitive schemas.
5. Depressed persons will score higher in non-motion 
language as a result of an increase in verb forms containing 
variations of the verb "to be". This usage of the verb "to 
be" by depressed persons suggests a greater preoccupation 
with perceived self traits and states of being. In other 
words, depressed persons will use more constructions of the 
form " I am . . . " o r  "It is . ...". This reflects a 
tendency to perceive undesirable traits while at the same 
time showing a less action oriented point of view. While 
such a hypothesis is not explicit in Beck's theory, it is 
intimated in his theory and is based on the linguistic work 
of Korzybski (1933), and Bourland (1965) who developed a 
language he called E-prime, which consists of English 
without any of the verb forms of "to be". It was Bourland's 
assertion that such a language results in more precise and 
clearer thinking, with less of the sorts of over­
generalizations and vague references that Beck hypothesizes 
are the source of much of the distorted cognitions leading 
to depression. Additionally, such a finding would be a 
replication of Andreasen and Pfohl (1976) who found that 
depressed persons used more "state of being " verbs than did 
their manic subjects.
6. Depressed persons will score higher in all catego­
ries of negated existence, suggesting an overall "negative" 
point of view corresponding to Beck's cognitive triad, while 
correspondingly non-depressed persons will score higher in
41
measures of positive existential density. This category of 
variables deals with an epistemological viewpoint of whether 
information is defined by affirmation or whether information 
is known by its negation (Fisher, 1985).
7. Depressed persons will score higher in assymmetric 
relational density which is associated with the passive 
voice and a more passive or "victim" like approach to life. 
However, this could vary from topic to topic as a depressed 
person might perceive personal responsibility for a failure 
that a non-depressed person might consider out of his/her 
control.
8. The overall level of activity as measured by the 
total word count (Perceptual-Cognitive Activity) will be 
lower for depressed subjects reflecting lowered cognitive 
activity in general.
All of the above hypotheses are derived from the types 
of linguistic and cognitive distortions that Beck et al. 
(1979) and to a lesser degree Seligman (1974) state are the 
cause of depression. They have been translated into a form 
that is operationalized in the 36 variables of the SLCA-III 
program and are, thus, capable of being measured and scored 
by that program. The details of the procedure, the types of 
subjects to be used , the instruments to be used, and the 
rationale for each will be presented in the next section.
METHOD f
Subjects
Subjects were 64 female undergraduate volunteers 
drawn from undergraduate psychology courses. The mean age of 
all subjects used in the study was 20.25 years. For the non­
depressed group the mean age was 20.4 with a range of 18 to 
25 years whereas the depressed group had a mean age of 20.1 
and a range of 18 to 24 years. Females only were used for 
this initial study for two reasons. First, the majority of 
reported cases of depression are female. Secondly, Cummings 
and Renshaw (1979) and Johnson (1980) have shown that 
language usage, as measured by the SLCA-III program, differs 
with age, sex, education, and socioeconomic level. Choosing 
the subjects from one sex and from a further restricted 
sample pool (college undergraduates) was an attempt to 
control for these variables.
Coder
To prepare the language samples obtained from the 
subjects for computer analysis by the SLCA-III program, one 
coder (a high school English honor student) was trained in 
the encoding procedures described in the SLCA-III manual 
(see Appendix F . ). The obtained samples were first trans­
scribed from tape into typewritten form on computer 
diskette. These diskettes were delivered to the coder. 
Following the rules in the manual, the samples were encoded
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with symbols (+,-,++) placed before certain parts of 
speech, as per the SLCA manual. To ensure no bias in the 
coding the coder was not informed as to the nature of the 
study nor was the group membership of the samples identified 
in the raw text supplied to the coder. As a measure of 
reliability one of the 12 tapes (16 messages, 8.333% of the 
total messages) was independently coded and the results 
compared to those obtained by the coder. Of the 3261 words 
in those messages 1939 required some form of encoding. Of 
those 1939 words, 1923 were in agreement, a figure of 
99.17%.
Instruments
BDI The Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961; Beck, 1967, 1978) has been 
shown to be a valid and reliable measure of current 
depression when used according to specified conditions. 
(Bumberry, Oliver, & McClure, 1978; Sacco, 1981; Seitz, 
1970). It consists of 21 items covering depressive symptoms 
and attitudes. Each item has four or five self-evaluative 
answers associated with it and the respondent chooses one. 
Each of the answers is weighted so that the inventory yields 
a total score of between 0 and 63, with lower scores 
indicating less depression. The full text of the Inventory 
is included in Appendix G.
Beck et al. (1961) reported a Spearman-Brown split-half 
correlation of .93 as one measure of its reliability. Ad­
ditionally, Beck et al. did an interitem analysis and a
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modified retest procedure as a measure of both validity and 
reliability. As a specific validation procedure, Beck et 
al. correlated the scores obtained on the inventory with a 
four class depth of depression rating using four experienced 
psychiatrists as raters. In two separate studies they found 
correlations of .65 and .67 between the inventory and the 
depth of depression. Seitz (1970) found that the BDI corre­
lated .83 with the Zung Depression Scale (Zung, 1965) and 
.63 with the Miskimin Self Goal Other Discrepancy Scale 
(Miskimin, 1968). He also compared the BDI with the MMPI 
Depression Scale (Hathaway & McKinley, 1943) and found a 
correlation of .41. In addition, he also used a psychiatric 
rating and found a correlation of .19. Bumberry et al.
(1978) found a correlation of .77 between the BDI and 
psychiatric rating using a university population.
For this study, inclusion into either the depressed or 
non-depressed group was based on BDI scores of greater than 
16 and less than 4 respectively. The score indicating non­
depression was chosen to make the differences between 
the groups wider. Beck et al. use scores below 10 as 
indicative of no depression. Bumberry et al. found this 
figure to include 77% of a university population. The figure 
of 16 or greater is termed by Beck and others as indicative 
of moderate depression and has been found by Bumberry et al. 
to include 7% of a university population.
SLCA-III The Syntactic Language Computer Analysis is 
discussed in some detail in Appendix E. It was obtained for
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use in the study from Dr. H. Wayland Cummings, Dept, of 
Communications, University of Oklahoma, one of the developers 
of the program, and placed on the computer at the LSU 
Student Network Computer Center. Briefly, this computerized 
language analysis system is based on three linguistic 
dimensions: 1) informational units (nouns, pronouns, or 
other subject signs); 2) relational units (verbs or con­
nectors); and 3) quantifier-qualifier units (adjectives and 
adverbs). Language samples are rated in terms of the 
relative frequency of each of these types of units. A 
probability view of language is derived which is based on 
eight qualities or categories of language usage which are:
1) social perception, 2) sensation, 3) existence, 4) motion, 
5) definition 6) time, 7) reflexiveness and 8) condi­
tionality. Also included are aggregate classes of the fre­
quencies of total information units, total relational units 
and total qualifiers as well as a total word count referred 
to as Perceptual-Cognitive Activity (PCA). These classes are 
described in greater detail in Appendix E. From these eight 
classes and the aggregates, a total of 36 variables is 
generated. These variables are not nor were they meant to be 
independent of one another but are independent within each 
of the eight classes. How these variables are translated 
into hypotheses based on Beck's and others cognitive 
theories of depression is described at the end of the intro­
duction section. The SLCA program itself consists of four 
parts: A) the Analyze program, B) the Numbers program, C) a
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set of Dictionaries used by the Analyze Program, and D) a 
DMerge program to expand the dictionaries. The Analyze 
program reads the language samples after they have been 
properly encoded using rules included in appendix F. It then 
produces data for each message which is compiled by the 
Numbers program to provide a measure for each of the 
variables described. This output of scores served as the 
raw data for further statistical analysis.
Procedure An initial pool of over 250 subjects was 
recruited, drawn from large undergraduate psychology clas­
ses, with extra credit being awarded for participation as 
per university practice. An administration of the BDI was 
given in a large group setting with all subjects told that 
some subjects would be chosen for additional participation. 
At the time of their initial participation, all subjects 
were given a consent form (see Appendix H . ) and a 
demographic information sheet (Appendix I.) asking for age, 
year in school, race, and an estimate of family income as 
well as telephone number, along with the BDI form. To insure 
confidentiality, all subjects were asked to only use their 
first name, last initial and last four digits of their 
student number to identify their BDI and demographic sheets. 
Upon completion of all forms subjects were asked to remain 
while the BDI was scored. Those whose scores met the 
inclusion criteria of either less than four or greater than 
16 were asked to remain and were scheduled for an individual 
session of approximately 3/4 hour, usually later in the same 
day but in no case more than three days later.
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From the large groups, 64 subjects met the inclusion 
criteria At the second session the following procedure was 
used.
First, each subject was given a packet consisting of 
an instruction sheet and an individual sheet each containing 
one of each the three experimental stimuli along with a 
cassette tape recorder. After being given sufficient in­
struction in the use of the tape recorder to ensure that the 
subject was capable of correct operation, the subject was 
taken to a private room where she was left alone with the 
tape recorder and instructions. Each subject was given ver­
bal instruction to the effect that this is a study of speech 
habits and that she would be asked to respond to the stimuli 
in the instruction packet by speaking into the tape 
recorder. Each subject was instructed not to erase or re­
record once she had started speaking on each stimulus as 
these spontaneous corrections and changes are part of the 
study. Each subject was asked if there are any questions and 
told to be thinking about any dramatic life incidents such 
as a scary, exciting or joyous event or time in their lives. 
This served as a warm-up to decrease the likelihood of a 
speech block. Then the subjects were told to open the packet 
and begin. The examiner then left the room.
The face sheet given to all subjects stated,
"Enclosed in this packet you will find three en­
velopes each containing a separate item for you to 
respond to by speaking about the topic for 
approximately five minutes. The items are numbered 
in the order you are to respond to them. Open each 
item only in the correct sequence and only after
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you have responded to the preceeding item. For each 
item, read the item carefully, turn on the tape 
recorder, being certain that it is in the record 
mode and begin speaking. Begin each item by stating 
" Item one, etc." After speaking for approximately 
5 minutes and when finished please leave a small 
pause on the tape then open the next envelope and 
repeat the procedure ,stating "item two " and so 
on. Repeat the procedure for each item. After 
completing all three items bring the tape recorder 
and packet back to the examiner. Thank you for 
your cooperation."
Each subject was given the following three stimuli given 
in a counterbalanced order determined by a Latin Square 
procedure.
Stimulus One Positive Experience
"This is a study of speaking and 
conversational habits. I would like you to speak 
for five minutes about any interesting or dramatic 
personal life experiences of a positive nature you 
may have had. Do not think too deeply about what 
you intend to say. This is not a study of public 
speaking ability. Say generally what first occurs 
to to you. Remember to talk for approximately 5 
minutes, (modified from Gotschalk, Winget &
Gleser, 1969, p.5)
Stimulus Two Negative Experience
"Thank You. Now I would like you to speak for 
five minutes about your most embarrassing or 
most negative experience."
Stimulus Three Opinion Item
"Thank You. Now I would like you to speak for 
five minutes and give some of your thoughts as 
to why a free press is important in a 
democracy."
The instructions were modified so that the
initial stimulus for each subject gave the general
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information about the study of conversational habits. The 
text of all stimuli is in Appendix J. Upon completion of the 
sample periods each subject was informed of the nature of the 
study in general terms and requested not to discuss the study 
with other members of the class or friends involved in the 
study until the study was concluded. The only identifying 
information included with each sample was a subject number 
that was assigned at the time the initial BDI was scored.
Each set of samples was given an encoded subject number with 
no identifying information classifying the subject according 
to group. Group assignment for the language samples was only 
matched after the samples had been encoded and scored using 
the SLCA-III procedures.
The language samples thus collected were transcribed 
onto diskette and encoded using the rules of the SLCA pro­
gram (see Appendix F.). These rules call for the addition of 
symbols such as "+" or to identify certain words and
parts of speech. Encoding was done by a hired, independent 
rater trained in the procedure but unaware of either the 
full intent of the study or group membership of the samples. 
When all data was encoded, each language sample was indivi­
dually run through the SLCA-III program at the LSU Computer 
Center, producing the frequency counts for the variables 
described in Appendix E. The resulting numbers were used as 
the basis for further statistical analysis. This resulted in 
a total of 192 coded messages from 64 subjects. Lastly, the 
three messages from each subject were merged to form an
50
aggregate message for each subject for use as an informal 
validation sample for the subsequent discriminant function 
analysis and for possible use in another study using dif­
fering analysis procedures. This aggregate message was also 
run through the SLCA-III program, yielding scores for the 36 
var iables.
Statistical Analysis After the numbers portion of the SLCA- 
III program compiled the raw scores for the variables, 
each variable was subjected to a univariate Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA), with GROUP classification (DEPRESSED vs. 
NON-DEPRESSED) and sample STIMULI (POSITIVE, NEGATIVE or 
OPINION) being treated as main effects in a repeated 
measures analysis. When significant differences for the main 
effect-STIMULUS were found, Duncan's Multiple Range Test 
was used to determine signficant differences among the group 
means. Univariate analysis was chosen rather than 
multivariate procedures because of the interdependence and 
highly correlated nature of the variables. Finally, a for­
ward stepwise multiple discriminant function analysis 
(Klecka, 1980) was done to determine if correct clas­
sification could be attained using the SLCA-III variables. 
The resulting classification function was informally 
validated on the aggregate messages. Results are presented 
in the next section.
RESULTS
For the main effect GROUP, 6 of the 36 SLCA variables 
were found to be significant and to distinguish Depressed 
from Non-Depressed subjects. These are:
Qualitative-Quantitative Density (total qualifiers). 
Non-Depressed persons showed a greater use of qualifiers in 
general, F(l,62) = 6 .955, p. <.02.
Non-sensed Information Units (abstract nouns). Depres­
sed persons used more abstract nouns, F(l,62) = 6.719, £. 
<.02.
Negative Existential Density (negated nouns). Depres­
sed persons used more negated nouns, F(l, 62 ) = 5. 238, p..
< . 0 5 .
Positive Qualifiers (adjectives & adverbs). Non- 
Depressed persons used more non-negated adjectives and 
adverbs, F(l, 62) = 6.990, p.. <.02.
Asymmetric Relational Units (intransitive verbs). De­
pressed persons used a greater frequency F(l,62) = 4 .485, p.. 
<.05, of intransitive verbs which are associated with the 
passive voice.
Static Density (state of being verbs). Depressed persons 
used more, F(l,62) = 4.701, p.. <.05, of various forms of 
the verb "to be".
All of these findings were hypothesized. Several other 
effects were also hypothesized and were not found to be 
significant. These will be discussed in the next section.
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A summary of all the ANOVA results for the main effect- 
GROUP is reported in Table 1. Table 2 contains means and 
standard deviations by group.
For the main effect STIMULUS, 29 of the 36 SLCA-III 
variables were found to differ significantly (see Table 1). 
Only the variables that did not show significant differences 
will be listed here. They are: Negative Existential Density 
(negated nouns), Positive Authority Perception (proper 
nouns), Positive Generalized Other references (indefinite 
pronouns such as "someone", "anyone"), Positive Audience 
Perception (second person pronouns), Undefined Information 
Units (unqualified nouns & pronouns), Asymmetric Relat.
Units (intransitive verbs), and Assertion Density (use of 
the indicative mood).
For 16 of the variables showing a significant main 
effect for stimulus, the only significant difference among 
means was that the Opinion stimulus differed from the other 
two (Positive & Negative) which did not differ from one 
another. All of the other differences will not be presented 
in text. Table 3 shows the summary of all ANOVAS for the 
main effect-STIMULUS. Table 4 gives all means and standard 
deviations by stimulus and shows the results of the Duncan's 
Multiple Range Tests.
There were no significant interaction of GROUP x 
STIMULUS effects for any of the 36 variables.
53
Table 1
Summary of ANOVAS for Main Effect - GROUP
Variable df F S.-
Percept.- Cogn. Activ. (1,62) .456 NS
Information Units (1,62) 3.759 NS
Relational Density (1,62) 3.656 NS
Qual-Quant. Density (1,62) 6.955 <.02
Sensed Inform.Units (1,62) .003 NS
Unsensed Inform. Units (1,62) 6.719 <.02
Sensed Qualifiers (1,62) 2.604 NS
Unsensed Qualifiers (1,62) 3.908 NS
Positive Exist. Density (1,62) 1.145 NS
Negative Exist. Density (1,62) 5.238 <.05
Positive Qualifiers (1,62) 6.990 <.02
Negated Qualifiers (1,62) .020 NS
Positive Relat.Units (1,62) 1.662 NS
Negative Relat. Units (1,62) 1.624 NS
Positive Authority (1,62) .864 NS
Negative Authority (1,62) 2.633 NS
Pos. General. Other (1,62) .004 NS
Neg. General. Other (1,62) .002 NS
Positive Self Percep. (1,62) 2.798 NS
Negative Self Percep. (1,62) .355 NS
Pos. Audience Percep. (1,62) .980 NS
Neg. Audience Percep. (1,62) 1.727 NS
Inanimate Perception (1,62) .154 NS
Defined Inform. Units (1,62) 3.639 NS
Undefined Inform. Units (1,62) .000 NS
Defined Relat. Units (1,62) .927 NS
Undefined Relat. Units (1,62) .492 NS
Symmetric Relat. Units (1,62) .114 NS
Asymmetric Relat. Units (1,62) 4.485 <.05
Motion Density (1,62) .132 NS
Static Density (1,62) 4.701 <.05
Past Time Density (1,62) .527 NS
Present Time Density (1,62) .278 NS
Future Time Density (1,62) .039 NS
Assertion Density (1,62) 2.739 NS
Conditional Density (1,62) .009 NS
54
Table 2





Percep-Cogn Activ. 182.94 203.21 197.70 233.15
Information Units .3358 .0458 .3483 .0384
Relation Density .2601 .0453 .2704 .0255
Qual-Quant Density * .4041 .0736 .3813 .0525
Sensed (IU) Dens. .1847 .0423 .1855 .0430
Non-sensed (IU) Dens. .1506 .0434 * .1618 .0454
Sensed (QQ) Density .1352 .0588 .1260 .0435
Non-sensed (QQ) Dens. .2699 .0410 .2551 .0469
Pos. Exist. Density .0848 .0292 .0808 .0202
Neg. Exist. Density .2515 .0596 * .2681 .0430
Positive (QQ) Dens. * .3991 .0737 .3748 .0525
Negative (QQ) Dens. .0061 .0061 .0063 .0072
Positive Relat. Dens. .2400 .0412 .2481 .0262
Negative Relat. Dens. .0186 .0142 .0219 .0141
Positive Auth. Percep. .0008 .0025 .0005 .0016
Negative Auth. Percep. .0024 .0053 .0042 .0078
Pos. Gener. Other Per. .0043 .0054 .0041 .0063
Neg. Gener. Other Per. .0345 .0294 .0326 .0198
Positive Self Percep. .0063 .0068 .0085 .0116
Negative Self Percep. .0897 .0439 .0926 .0402
Positive Audience Per. .0010 .0030 .0005 .0018
Negative Audience Per. .0139 .0229 .0196 .0209
Inanimate Perception .1834 .0431 .1862 .0439
Defined Informat. Den. .3346 .0463 .3473 .0380
Undefined Inform. Den. .0017 .0042 .0016 .0030
Defined Relat. Dens. .0734 .0288 .0792 .0294
Undefined Relat. Dens. .1852 .0470 .1908 .0391
Symmetric Relat. Dens. .1282 .0380 .1273 .0287
Asymmetric Relat. Den. .1304 .0355 * .1427 .0293
Motion Density .1723 .0438 .1734 .0350
Static Density .0863 .0321 * .0966 .0261
Past Time Density. .0739 .0496 .0792 .0513
Present Time Dens. .1681 .0628 .1736 .0556
Future Time Dens. .0166 .0166 .0173 .0151
Assertion Density .2396 .0441 .2503 .0268
Conditional Density .0189 .0165 .0197 .0181
* significant at £,.<.05 from ANOVA
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Table 3
Summary of ANOVAS for Main Effect - STIMULUS
Variable 11 F a-
Percept.- Cogn. Activ. (2 124) 16.58 <.001
Information Units (2 124) 6.34 <.01
Relational Density (2 124) 17.78 <.001
Qual-Quant. Density (2 124) 12.17 <.001
Sensed Inform. Units (2 124) 24.91 <.001
Unsensed Inform. Units (2 124) 67.64 <.001
Sensed Qualifiers (2 124) 43.79 <.001
Unsensed Qualifiers (2 124) 3.98 <.05
Positive Exist. Dens. (2 124) 3.31 <.05
Negative Exist. Dens. (2 124) 1.98 NS
Positive Qualifiers (2 124) 10.94 <.001
Negated Qualifiers (2 124) 4.03 <.05
Positive Relat. Units (2 124) 6.40 <.01
Negative Relat. Units (2 124) 16.65 <•001
Positive Authority (2 124) 1.54 NS
Negative Authority (2 124) 7.00 <.01
Pos. General. Other (2 124) 1.85 NS
Neg. General. Other (2 124) 4.08 <.02
Positive Self Percep. (2 124) 11.05 <.001
Negative Self Percep. (2 124) 33.91 <.001
Pos. Audience Percep. (2 124) 1.73 NS
Neg. Audience Percep. (2 124) 3.91 < .05
Inanimate Perception (2 124) 65.54 <.001
Defined Inform. Units (2 124) 6.40 <.01
Undefined Inform. Units (2 124) 1.08 NS
Defined Relat. Units (2 124) 27.97 <.001
Undefined Relat. Units (2 124) 44.74 <•001
Symmetric Relat. Units (2 124) 18.00 <.001
Asymmetric Relat. Units (2 124) 2.88 NS
Motion Density (2 124) 3.62 <.05
Static Density (2 124) 4.92 <.01
Past Time Density (2 124) 122.52 <.001
Present Time Density (2 124) 98.47 <.001
Future Time Density (2 124) 35.28 <.001
Assertion Density (2 124) 1.40 NS
Conditional Density (2 124) 27.08 <.001
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Table 4







•Percept.-Cogn. Activ. 227.78 110.50 207.59 117.91 140.26 a 73.94
•Infornation Units .3409 .0401 .3291 .0407 .3558 a .0505
•Relational. Density .2535 .0343 .2623 .0227 .2840 a .0299
•Dual-Quant. Density .4075 .0684 .4086 .0555 .3602 a .0632
•Sensed Inforn. Units .1999 .0261 .2005 .0467 .1555 a .0483
•Non-sensed Inforn. Units .1430 c .0331 .1286 c .0369 .2003 c .0417
•Sensed Qualifiers .1553 .0617 .1484 .0332 .0837 a .0350
•Non-sensed Qualifiers .2536 b .0423 .2602 .0432 .2765 b .0566
•Pos. Exist. Density .0879 b .0268 .0765 b .0199 .0857 .0309
Neg. Exist. Density .2533 .0526 .2526 .0460 .2701 .0640
•Positive Qualifiers .4037 .0742 .4007 .0560 .3556 a .0635
•Negated Qualifiers .0055 .0053 .0079 a .0084 .0046 .0062
•Positive Relation Units .2409 .0329 .2399 .0234 .2567 a .0305
•Negative Relation Units .0126 a .0097 .0224 .0150 .0273 .0173
Positive Authority .0009 .0027 .0009 .0024 .0003 .0014
•Negative Authority .0059 a .0100 .0018 .0039 .0021 .0059
Pos. General. Qther .0033 .0032 .0055 .0088 .0040 .0061
•Neg. General. Qther .0263 b .0197 .0322 .0275 .0387 b .0231
•Positive Self Percept. .0099 .0144 .0096 .0083 .0025 a .0054
•Negative Self Percept. .1019 .0375 .1099 .0366 .0578 a .0415
Pos. Audience Percept. .0004 .0013 .0007 .0033 .0012 .0032
•Neg. Audience Percept. .0157 .0193 .0123 b .0200 .0225 b .0295
•Inaninate Perception .1744 c .0382 .1562 c .0375 .2268 c .0378
•Defined Inforn. Units .3402 .0395 .3271 b .0413 .3541 b .0503
Undefined Inforn. Units .0011 .0022 .0020 .0043 .0018 .0044
•Defined Relat. Units .0787 c .0195 .0916 c .0307 .0581 c .0302
•Undefined Relat. Units .1747 .0352 .1707 .0355 .2258 a .0369
•Synnetric Relat. Units .1199 .0291 .1184 .0319 .1483 a .0319
Asynnetric Relat. Units .1321 .0299 .1439 .0288 .1357 .0373
•Notion Density .1692 .0354 .1689 b .0348 .1846 b .0438
•Static Density .0842 b .0238 .0934 .0272 .0994 b .0373
•Past Tine Density .0996 .0371 .1104 .0430 .0165 a .0273
•Present Tine Density .1443 .0455 .1391 .0465 .2374 a .0416
•future Tine Density .0097 .0131 .0128 .0134 .0300 a .0184
Assertion Density .2419 .0375 .2461 .0258 .2515 .0331
•Conditional Density .0112 .0102 .0162 .0130 .0324 a .0246
Note. * significant at p.< .05 fron ANDVA
Note. Heans with 'a* beside only significant difference at g. < .05 fron Duncan's Multiple Range Test
Note. Heans with "b* beside differ only fron one another but not fron the third as above
Note. Heans with V  beside all differ fron one another
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The 6 SLCA-III variables for the POSITIVE and NEGATIVE
stimuli which showed significant differences were entered as
predictor variables into a forward stepwise discriminant
function selection method using the minimum Wilk's Lambda to
2
control the selection. The .05 level of X was chosen to 
control the Wilk's Lambda with the minimum F-to-enter set at 
1.00 and F-to-remove set at 0.0, a standard set of para­
meters. By this procedure three variables, all from the 
POSITIVE stimulus were chosen. The summary of the stepwise 
analysis is included in Table 5 with the classification 
functions in Table 6. These variables are: Static Density, 
Negative Existential Density, and Non-sensed Information 
Unit Density. The derived function correctly classified
71.875% of the cases. Given the 50% probability of correct
2
classification by chance, this finding is significant, X 
(1, N =64) = 12.3, p.. <.0005. Table 7 shows this classifi­
cation matrix. As an informal validation procedure, the 
derived classification function was run on the merged aggre­
gate messages (the combined output for each subject from all
three stimuli) and correctly classified 65.625% of the sub-
2
jects, a figure also significant, X (1, N = 64) = 7.27, p. 
<.01.









Static Density 10.290 .853936 .002 (1,62)
Neg. Exist. Dens. 5.236 .799969 .025 (1,61)




Static Density 138.9463 171.0917
Neg. Exist. Density 80.1082 88.9728










Non-Depressed 32 22 10 68.750
Depressed 32 8 24 75.000
Totals 64 30 34 71.875
2
Note. X (1. N = 64) = 12.30, £. <.0005
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Table 8
Classification Matrix - Aggregate Messages






Non-Depressed 32 15 17 46.875
Depressed 32 5 27 84.375
Totals 64 20 44 65.625
2
Note. X (1, N = 64) = 7.27, £. <.01
DISCUSSION
The first results to be discussed will be those dealing 
with the main effect STIMULUS. For 16 of the 29 variables 
that were found to differ significantly by stimulus, the 
result of the Duncan's tests showed that only the OPINION 
stimulus differed from the other two, which did not differ 
from one another. This suggests that the OPINION stimulus 
was qualitatively different from the other two. It is 
essentially an emotionally neutral, conceptual and abstract 
topic calling for clearly different types of thoughts and 
responses than either the POSITIVE or NEGATIVE stimuli which 
asked for personal, emotionally significant, past-based 
recollections and evaluations. It might even be assumed that 
most persons found it boring and were less interested in it 
because of all three stimuli it received the lowest total 
word count. For the other 13 significant differences, the 
results were what would be expected from the content of the . 
stimuli, positive events called for positive types of 
variables, etc. While this finding addresses the 
discriminative ability of the SLCA-III program to distinguish 
among differing types of message input, it adds little to 
the discussion of differences between depressed and non­
depressed subjects. Had there been any significant inter­
actions of GROUP x STIMULUS where depressed persons responded 
one way to a stimulus and non-depressed another, further 
discussion of this effect would be warranted, tapping, as it
60
61
were, some difference in cognition or perception that varied 
by group and stimuli between depressed and non-depressed 
persons.
Cummings and Renshaw (1979) recognized the sensitivity 
of the program and the problems of interpretation when they 
said, "Earlier versions, though successful, tended to gene­
rate more data than researchers could interpret. One should 
have a strong theoretic rationale for the study of language 
in the communication setting." Because this study was ex­
ploratory in nature, the stimuli used were chosen to gene­
rate a language sample from each subject that was as wide as 
possible, yet managable enough for coding and analysis. 
Additional research can more narrowly focus the stimuli 
along theoretical lines. A researcher may, for example, more 
completely test some of Beck's hypotheses, by developing 
stimuli which deal with a subject's description of 
him/herself, how he/she perceives his/her future, an opinion 
of the state of the world in general, an opinion of his/her 
relationships with others, and so forth. The list becomes 
endless. Some of these topic might possibly generate the 
interaction effects that would be most useful.
The primary focus of this study concerned the main 
effect GROUP and the hypothesized differences in cognition 
that were to be reflected and detectable by differences in 
language syntax. The general hypothesis, that differences 
would be found between depressed and non-depressed subjects, 
is supported. Six of the 36 SLCA-III variables were found to
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differentiate depressed from non-depressed subjects. All six 
of these variables were among those hypothesized to be 
significant. Also, while the following result will not be 
discussed in detail because it is not part of the original 
design of the study and statistical conventions do not allow 
such an exclusion on a post hoc basis, when the OPINION 
stimulus was removed from the analysis, 12 of the 36 vari­
ables were found to differentiate depressed persons from 
non-depressed. However that finding can wait for a replica­
tion study.
The first specific hypothesis was that non-depressed 
persons would show greater use of qualifiers, suggesting 
greater richness and diversity of experience. This 
hypothesis was borne out with non-depressed persons using 
more qualifiers. This finding is in partial replication of 
Andreasen and Pfohl (1975) who found that depressives used 
fewer adjectives than manics did. Because they had no control 
group and their groups were of mixed sex and varied widely in 
age, the results cannot be compared directly but the 
finding is in the same direction.
The second specific hypothesis was that depressed 
persons would show greater use of personal pronouns. This 
hypothesis was not supported and it appears due to the 
nature of the stimuli. Asking subjects to describe a 
personal experience is quite likely to load for personal 
pronouns, while asking about an abstract concept might not 
load for enough. Perhaps this hypothesis could be more
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adequately researched if a spontaneous sample of 
conversation were taken in an observed interaction as 
through a one-way mirror.
The third specific hypothesis was that depressed 
persons would show a greater use of generalized other 
(indefinite third person) pronouns suggestive of cognitive 
vagueness. This hypothesis was not supported in this study 
although it was a minor finding in the Andreasen and Pfohl 
study. Here again the specific nature of the stimuli, 
calling for specific personal events, might mitigate against 
the use of such indefinite pronouns. Andreasen and Pfohl 
generated their language samples in part from proverb inter­
pretations and from what they termed "spontaneous free 
speech" taken in response to general questions such as "Tell 
me about your family" or "What are you like?" While such 
questions are likely to generate useful samples if investi­
gated systematically, such was not the case in their study. 
They simply used the first 80 words of proverb interpreta­
tion and the first 320 words of speech. Further research 
might use a sample generated from spontaneous observed 
conversation to test this hypothesis of greater use of 
indefinite third person pronouns by depressed persons.
The fourth specific hypothesis was that depressed 
persons would show a greater usage of unsensed 
information (abstract nouns), types of vague non-sensory 
items that are part of Beck's hypothesized schemas which the 
depressed person would want to keep from direct
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contradiction. Because the information is abstract and non- 
sensory it is less subject to objective verification. This 
hypothesis was supported. Depressed persons did use more of 
these abstract nouns than their counterparts. However, it 
was also thought within this hypothesis that non-sensed 
qualifiers would be higher for depressed persons for the same 
reason. The results did not support this hypothesis. The two 
groups did not differ on non-sensed qualifiers, perhaps 
because of the previous finding of non-depressed subjects 
using greater numbers of qualifiers generally.
The fifth specific hypothesis was that depressed 
persons would score higher in non-motion (state of being) 
verb usage, that is use of the verb "to be" and its forms 
such as "I am, It is, are, was," etc. The use of this verb 
is associated with states of being rather than action, 
traits rather than skills. Korzybski (1933) wrote 
extensively of the types of logical errors that ensue from 
the use of "to be" and his student and colleague Bourland 
(1965) proposed a language he called E-Prime which does not 
use any form of "to be". For example, the connotations 
between the statement "I failed." and "I am a failure." are 
significantly different, although the general meaning is 
thought to be the same. This hypothesis was supported by 
the data. Depressed persons did use more of these state of 
being verbs. This finding is also a partial replication of 
the Andreasen and Pfohl finding where depressed subjects used 
more state of being verbs than did manics.
The sixth specific hypothesis was that depressed sub­
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jects would score higher in all areas of negative existence 
and conversely non-depressed subjects would score higher in 
measures of positive existence. This category of variables 
is a subtle and complex one and essentially deals with an 
epistemological point of view. Is information known by af­
firmation or by negation? A simple example of this is when 
someone responds to a question of health with "not bad".
Here a positive response is worded negationally. A more 
complex and stilted reply that illustrates the point might 
be " My dysfunctions are not intolerable." Fisher (1985) 
discussed this use of negated epistemology as a form of 
defensive stance and he went so far as to relate various 
forms of negation to the classicial defense mechanisms of 
denial, displacement, and repression. While such an exten­
sive or radical interpretation is not proposed here, it is 
suggested that negation is related to a negative manner of 
relating to the world as proposed by Beck. Fisher argued 
that this negative epistemology should be visible in syntax 
when he said, " Because these formulations are in terms of 
syntax, the structure of a person's natural language is to 
some extent indicative of defensive dynamics, the negation 
of meaning may be accomplished by syntactic adjustments, and 
different kinds of surface displays of language may reflect 
negations which mark defensive propositions." (p. 191)
This hypothesis was partially supported since depressed 
persons showed higher usage of negative existential density 
(negated nouns) and non-depressed subjects used a greater
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number of positive existential qualifiers (adjective and 
adverbs). This relationship was found in only 2 of the 6 
variables of this class. However, this relationship of 
negative existential density and positive qualifier density 
was also found by Edelman (1981) to distinguish real from 
simulated suicide notes.
The seventh specific hypothesis was that depressed 
persons would score higher in asymmetric verb usage. This 
is the use of intransitive verbs, essentially associated 
with the passive voice. It was hypothesized that depressed 
persons would use the passive voice more frequently 
suggesting a more "victim-like" orientation to the world.
While this hypothesis is not explicitly stated in Beck's 
formulations, it can be inferred from his notion of the 
negative view of self and the world. Also this hypothesis is 
in line with Seligman's (1974) formulations of learned 
helplessness in depression. This hypothesis was supported 
by the data with depressed persons using a greater number of 
asymmetric constructions than did the non-depressed persons.
The eighth and last hypothesis was that Perceptual- 
Cognitive Activity (total word usage) would be lower for 
depressed subjects reflecting general psychomotor 
retardation and overall lowered activity level. This 
hypothesis was not supported. Perhaps the specific 
instructions to speak for 3-5 minutes on a topic overcame 
other factors and determined the total word output. This 
might be another variable that can be better tested in 
observed spontaneous conversations.
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Overall, six of the eight specific hypotheses and the 
general hypothesis were supported by the results. These 
findings are encouraging and suggest the potential utility 
of future research. However, it should be remembered here 
that this study used females only. Replication and compari­
son with a male group is needed before generalization. 
Secondly, this study dealt with levels of depression found 
within a fairly well functioning group of subjects, college 
students. Further work with clinical populations is needed 
for more far-ranging generalization of results. However, 
some speculation is in order.
The finding that the discriminant function correctly 
classified almost 72% of the cases and then when run on the 
combined aggregate messages correctly classified almost 66% 
of the subjects suggests that some form of syntactic analysis 
might prove to be a useful adjunct to other forms of 
testing, particularly in situations where malingering, or 
other forms of dissembling are possible. Because of the 
complexity and time intensive nature of these procedures, 
syntactic analysis is not meant to replace instruments such 
as the Beck Inventory but might prove useful in complemen­
ting the types of information obtained. A possible future 
study might be to have non-depressed subjects speak "as if" 
they were depressed and compare the results with a depressed 
group. It would be interesting to see if someone seeking to 
fake depression would be able to consciously alter syntax 
without mistakes. A study by Chapman (1976) using the SLCA
program reportedly was able to determine deception during an 
analysis of Richard Nixon's speeches. A second possible use 
of syntactic analysis as an adjunct to traditional clinical 
assessment might be analysis of message samples generated 
from Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) cards (Morgan &
Murray, 1935 ). While the TAT has been in use for fifty 
years, systems of scoring and interpretation are cumbersome 
and unreliable and therefore little used. A syntactic 
analysis might provide a more reliable alternate.means of 
interpretation, especially since the SLCA-III program is 
being modified for use on personal computers (Cummings,
1991, personal communication).
Now that syntactic analysis has shown that differences 
between depressed and non-depressed subjects can be detected 
syntactically, further research can be done to refine the 
differences and compare the findings with the cognitive 
theories of Beck and others. This would entail more 
carefully crafting the stimuli that generate the message 
samples. For example, to further test Beck's conceptions 
stimuli asking subjects to assess their futures, themselves, 
their skills, human nature, how they percieve others to see 
them, their faults, the list is large but could be construc­
ted to further explore the parameters of Beck's negative 
triad and varying schemas.
One of the tenets of this paper is that language usage 
reflects and is interwoven with cognition. The finding that 
syntax differs with the cognitive components attributed to 
depression suggests that syntax and language analysis might
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provide a reliable and replicable way of cataloging and 
measuring any number of other cognitive states or processes.
Another interesting use of SLCA-III analysis might be 
as an adjunct outcome measure for therapeutic interventions, 
one that might prove less biased by halo effects and 
positive therapeutic experiences and good relationships, etc. 
Samples could be taken going in to the intervention and 
compared with the sample taken at the end of the interven­
tion. In this same vein, syntactic analysis could be used as 
intermediate progress measures taken at points throughout the 
intervention to measure change. Of particular interest might 
be Beck's (Beck et.al.,1979) cognitive interventions. Simi­
larly, training in alternate linguistic usage more in line 
with "healthier" patterns might be undertaken to see if the 
relationship works in both directions and if improvement can 
be enhanced with syntactic training.
In other areas of psychopathology and developmental 
disability, syntactic analysis might also have some utility. 
Anecdotal evidence collected by this experimenter has found 
a number of cases where a referal to "rule out" mental 
retardation is made in cases where intellectual functioning 
as measured by standard intellectual tests is so low as to 
warrant the diagnosis but access to developmental, scholas­
tic, and vocational records is so poor as to make accurate 
diagnosis according to the developmental criteria all but 
impossible. The anecdotal evidence suggests that the language 
patterns of those persons suffering from schizophrenia, etc,
are different from true developmentally disabled persons but 
SLCA-III analysis might be able to corroborate this impres­
sion. In the same vein syntactic analysis of cases of head 
trauma or other neuropsychological dysfunction might prove 
useful as both a diagnostic and rehabilitative tool. Perhaps 
it could even be used in a manner similar to EEG's where an 
extensive sample could be taken from persons at risk such 
as is now done with athletes, etc. and subsequent to any 
injury or incident the sample could be compared with a post 
incident sample. Syntactic analysis might even have some 
utility in the study of memory dysfunctions related to 
alcoholism or Alzheimer's disease.
Ultimately syntactic analysis might provide the basis 
for more reliable and stable taxonomic systems than the 
current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM's) now in use, based on linguistic and 
cognitive information processing approachs.
For the time being the implication of this study is 
that depressed and non-depressed persons can be 
differentiated by syntactic analysis in what could prove to 
be a reliable and replicable method. Syntactic analysis by 
computer might prove the tool that can quantify and reliably 
measure any number of aspects of cognitive models in any 
number of areas, not just clinical applications. Cummings and 
Renshaw (1979) foreshaw just such use for this program when 
they said, "It is doubtful that an analysis of language 
behavior alone will reveal a one-for-one isomorphism with all 
mental and environmental activity; nevertheless, there seem
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to be important perceptual-cognitive properties accessible 
through a 'psychogrammatical study’ of language behavior. If 
a coherent set of language properties can be substantively 
and validly related to human experience we may be able to 
trace profiles of messages."(p.295) This study is one such 
attempt to validly relate an aspect of human experience, 
depression, with the coherent set of language properties 
contained in SLCA-III. The finding that syntax does differ 
in a state theorized to show differences of cognition allows 
for further exploration of any manner of theorized cognitive 
processes through the analysis of language and specifically 
the analysis of syntax.
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APPENDIX A.
COGNITIVE SCIENCE
This section will discuss in more detail, although again 
briefly, some of the current issues in the study of cognition. 
As volumes of books have been written on this subject, I cannot 
hope to do it justice here. My purpose here is to provide an 
outline or overview of some of the relevant issues as they 
suggest the train of thought in the present study.
While the study of elements of cognition is as old as 
the study of psychology itself and of course has its roots 
in the same philosophical underpinnings as that discipline; 
the blossoming discipline known as cognitive science is of 
fairly recent derivation and touches on or borrows ideas, 
methodology, and constructs from such diverse academic 
fields as: philosophy, linguistics, computer science 
especially artificial intelligence, psychology, information- 
processing, anthropology and sociology; with such mathematic 
areas as game theory, heuristics and stochastic processes 
thrown in. Sharkey (1986) defined the discipline of 
cognitive science as, " interdisciplinary, it uses the 
computational metaphor and its subject matter is the study 
of cognition/mind/thought/intelligence." Simon (1980) 
described it as, "the domain of inquiry that seeks to 
understand intelligent systems and the nature of 
intelligence." Miller, Poison and Kintsch (1986) pointed to
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the eclectic and interdisciplinary nature of cognitive 
science when they said it may be viewed as, " the collection 
of several pairwise intersections among anthropology, 
computer science, linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy and 
psychology." Pylyshyn (1984) argued that "there may well 
exist a natural domain corresponding to what has been called 
'cognition' which may well consist of a unifying set of 
pr inciples."
Many of the areas studied in cognitive science would be 
familiar to members of the respective parent disciplines. 
Cognitive psychologists would be familiar with the study of 
memory and recall, perception, and pattern recognition. 
Linguists would recognize, syntactics and structures, 
discourse analysis and parsing systems. Other disciplines 
would find familiar conceptions as well. All of these areas 
are outside the scope of this paper and will not be 
addressed. However there is one central subject or issue 
that even is controversial among proponents of cognitive 
science and it is this issue, the concept of "representation" 
which is central to the thesis of this paper and has 
consequences for cognitive psychology and any and all 
cognitive theories of psychopathology.
The basic tenent of representational theories is that 
through certain processes (either unspecified or specified 
depending on the theorist) an organism constructs 
"representations" of the environment, reality, etc and it 
is these representations, along with decision rules etc that 
form the contents and processes of cognition. Such
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representations are highly implied in the classic S-O-R 
conceptions of learning theory. Garfield (1990) stated,
"The concept of representation and its allied concepts - 
belief, perception, etc. - lie at the heart of cognitive 
science. For common to all noneliminativists accounts of 
psychology, of the nature of mind, and of linguistic 
behavior is the thesis that humans and other cognitively 
characterizable organisms manipulate representations. Most 
of the interesting substantive debates get going when we ask 
just what those representations are and how one could build 
them out of blind matter" (p. xxiii).
Again, the topic of representation is much too large 
for complete analysis here. Below are presented some ad­
ditional points of view regarding representation and cogni­
tion and one particular viewpoint, that of Jaynes (1976) 
will be discussed in some detail because of his contention 
that it is through linguistic processes that this represen­
tation is formed.
Bandler and Grinder (1975) argued that, through a 
process that they call modeling (not in the imitative sense 
as used by Bandura, but in the engineering sense), an 
individual builds up a symbolic representation of the 
environment with decision rules to interpret the incoming 
information. They state,"We create a map or model of the 
world which we use to generate our behavior. Our repre­
sentation of the world determines to a large degree what our 
experience of the world will be, how we will perceive the
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world and what choices we will see as available to us as we 
live in the worId” .(p .7)
Jaynes (1976) concurred with this position. He also com­
pares such an analogical representation with a map. He states 
that this map of cognition allows for the condensation and 
selective excerption of the essential features while at the 
same time it allows non-essential features to be ignored. As 
such, it provides for selective awareness and perception.
The cognitive map, like its physical counterpart, allows for 
the anticipation of future consequences and the accurate 
remembrance of past travels. To complete the metaphor, an 
inadequate map will lead to mistakes as will a flawed cogni­
tive model.
Mandler (1985) stated," Representation in the widest 
sense of the term is the central issue in cognitive 
psychology. The concept of representation is intimately tied 
to and may be possibly identical with, the issue of useful 
theory. Representational systems are the theoretical 
constructs that are postulated as responsible for ( that 
cause or generate) the observable thoughts, actions, etc. of 
the organism." (p. 11)
Minsky (1986) described this process, stating, "How do 
the signals that come to us give rise to our sense of "being 
in" the outside world? The answer is that this sense is a 
complicated illusion. We never actually make any direct 
contact with the outside world. Instead we work with models 
of the world that we build inside our brains."(p. 110)
Mahoney (1974) in looking at a a particular form of representa­
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tional analysis, the information processing model, stated,, "The 
information processing theorist takes a basic view of man as an 
active processor of experience rather than a passive or fun­
ctionally vacuous composite of stimulus response linkages. The 
organism is seen responding not to a 'real world' but to his own 
mediated rendition of it. This mediation often takes the form 
of stimulus selection, distortion and transformation, "(p.125) 
Building on this definition of cognition, Jaynes des­
cribed what he perceived to be six unique properties of human 
consciousness that are a direct result of the metaphorical 
origin of cognition. These are:
Spatialization. The illusion of an inner "mind space".
In this process, spatial reference becomes the metaphor for 
a number of concepts, of which the most pronounced is the 
impression of an inner space. When we see with our "mind's 
eye" or "hear ourselves think", we do so in this illusory 
mind space. Also our understanding of time is based on the 
metaphor of space or distance.
Excerption The process of attending to only limited 
elements of the environment at any given time.
The Analog I_. A subset of the analogical system which
involves the perception of self as an actor with specific
properties. Jaynes states of this property,
A most important feature of this metaphor 
world is the metaphor we have of ourselves, 
the analog I_, which can move about vica- 
rially in our imagination, doing things that 
we are not actually doing. ... We imagine 
ourselves doing this or that and thus make 
decisions on the basis of imagined outcomes 
that would be impossible if we did not have
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an imagined self behaving in an imagined 
world.(p .63)
The metaphor M e , Another subset of the cognitive analog 
which involves the perception of the self as an object to 
which things happen;
Narratization. The process whereby life experiences are 
woven into a unified whole and given personal meaning;
Jaynes describes this as, "seeing ourselves as the main 
figures in the stories of our lives."(p.63)
Conciliation The process whereby new information is 
categorized and interpreted in patterns that are consistent 
with previous information. Jaynes states,
What I am designating by conciliation is 
essentially doing in mind-space what narrati- 
zation does in mind-time or spatialized 
time. It brings things together as con­
scious objects just as narratization brings 
things together as a story. And this fitting 
together into a consistency or probability 
is done according to rules built up in ex­
perience. (p.65)
Thus, conscious thought is a process rather than a set 
of things, according to Jaynes. It operates by creating 
analogies, analog space, and an analog I which is capable of 
operating in that space. By using the features described 
above, cognition attributes meaning and order onto the envi­
ronment and behavior. Nothing can exist in the thought 
analog that did not exist in behavior first, although as an 
analog its correspondence to the original act need not be 
perfect. Jaynes reiterated the importance of linguistic or 
symbolic representation by saying, "... consciousness is this 
invention of an analog world on the basis of language, paral­
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leling the behavioral world even as the world of mathematics 
parallels the world of quantities of things..." (p.66)
The cognitive shemata of Beck and his specification of 
types of logical errors in the syndrome of depression are 
one example of a representational system and its subjective 
consequences for the individual.
REFERENCES 
APPENDIX A.
Bandler, R. & Grinder, J. (1975). The structure of magic: 
a book about language and therapy. Palo Alto, CA:
Science and Behavior Books.
Garfield, J. L. (1990). Foundations of cognitive science.
New York: Pergamon House.
Jaynes, J. (1976 ). The origin of consciousness in the 
breakdown of the bicameral mind. Boston: Houghton 
Miflin.
Mahoney, M. J. (1974). Cognition and behavior modification.
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Mandler, G. (1985). Cognitive psychology: An essay in 
cognitive science. Hillsdale, N J : Lawrence Erlbaum 
Miller, J. R., Poison, P. G., & Kintsch, W. (1986). Problems 
of methodology in cognitive science. In W. Kintsch,
J. R. Miller, & P. G. Poison (Eds.), Methods and tactics 
in cognitive science (pp.43-71). Hillsdale, N J : Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates.
Minsky, M. L. (1986). The society of mind. New York:
Simon & Schuster.
93
Pylyshyn, Z. (1984). Computation and cognition: toward a
foundation for cognitive science. London: MIT Press. 
Sharkey, N. E. (Ed.) (1986 ). Advances in cognitive science !L.
New York: Halstead Press.
Simon, H. A. (1980). Cognitive science: the newest science
of the artificial. Cognitive Science. £, 33-46.
APPENDIX B.
THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE
This section will provide some background on the topics 
of linguistics and some of the ways in which language has 
been studied including the division of language analysis 
into the areas of semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics, of 
which the primary focus of this study is syntactics and how 
they interrelate with cognitive schemas as postulated by Beck 
in depression. Shapiro (1979) in looking at the 
appropriateness of clinicians studying language stated, 
"Language is therefore ideal as a dimension for study in 
elaborating what is most characteristically human and has 
the virtue of a developmental sequence.... is a complex 
organization which involves motor control, cognitive 
structuring and social determinants in influences". (pl2.).
The first question concerning linguistic analysis is 
just what differentiates a language from another system of 
signs or symbols and therefore what differentiates human 
language from communicative signals as might be used by 
other species.
Hockett (1960) in a comparative analysis of the 
communication systems of eight species listed 13 features 
that make up language. These included: 1) vocal auditory 
channel, 2) broadcast transmission and directional recep­
tion, 3) rapid fading, 4) interchangeability, 5) total feed­
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back, 6) specialization, 7) semanticity, 8) arbitrariness,
9) discreteness, 10) displacement, 11) productivity, 12) 
traditional transmission, and 13) duality of patterning.
Only human communication uses all 13. Of these 13, the 
features of semanticity, displacement, and productivity are 
the most intimately involved with the ability of language to 
reflect and define the complexity of human cognition.
Semanticity is the process whereby a word becomes a 
symbol for an object. This process is so complete that a 
thing and its name become virtually inseparable in cogni­
tion. Displacement is the ability of language to represent 
objects and events that are distant in both space and time. 
Productivity refers to the ability of language to represent, 
conceptualize, and manipulate an almost infinite number of 
sentences, resulting in concepts whose referents have no 
other form of existence except as linguistic reference,
(i .e .,"freedom", "love", "unicorn". The above approach to 
the study of language is concerned with the attributes or 
features of language as a communicational system.
Morris (1964) subdivided the study of language into 
three broad areas: semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics. 
Semantics refers to the study of the meaning of words and 
the relationships of words as symbols to the referents they 
symbolize and represent. Syntactics refers to the study of 
the language and the classes of symbols which are used and 
their interrelationships with one another. Pragmatics 
refers to the relationship between the symbols of language 
or the symbolic process to the uses to which these symbols
96
are put. Pragmatics refers to the application of language 
and includes such topics as prosody (the melody of language 
pitch), irony, sarcasm, and para-linguistic features such as 
body language, gestures, tempo, facial expression, etc.
The area of semantics has been a very fertile one . for 
research and is an extremely complex area of linguistic 
analysis. While the question of the relationship of words 
to their referents is an important one with broad and pro­
found implications for the study of cognition, its sheer 
complexity precludes an adequate discussion in this paper. 
However, within the area of meaning are the concepts of 
denotation and connotation, referential and emotive meaning 
(Ogden & Richards, 1946), componential analysis, polar attri­
butes (Deese,1964), and lexical versus grammatical meaning.
As one example of the complexity of semantic analysis, Deese 
(1970) has estimated that an array having fifty features 
would be necessary to define meaning. Further, he believes
such an array would define the number of "thinkable con-
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cepts" as in excess of 2 or over 1,000 trillion. In an 
effort to scale down this impossible number of dimensions 
for meaning, Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) developed 
the semantic differential. They had subjects rate their 
impressions of words along a limited number of polar scales. 
Then they analysed these impressions using a factor analysis 
from which they derived three factors that accounted for a 
large portion of the variance. These factors are an evalua­
tive (good-bad) component, an activity (active-passive)
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component and, a potency (weak-strong) component.
The areas of semantics and pragmatics will not be 
further discussed in this paper. This study deals with 
essentially syntactic elements of speech. However, these 
lines of demarcation between semantics, syntactics, and 
pragmatics are arbitrary and fluid with a great deal of 
crossover, as discussed in the body of the introduction of 
this paper. The above topics were provided to allow some 
background and points of reference to the present study.
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As discussed previously in several places, many 
theorists have postulated that language behavior is a 
significant factor in cognition and by extention, a factor 
in psychopathology. Further, as cognitive models become 
more complex and perhaps more precise, taxonomic systems 
based on cognitive or linguisitic models might prove to be 
more reliable and useful than current categories of 
psychopathology. This viewpoint is not new however. In 
fact, researchers dating back to the turn of the century 
have studied and speculated upon the relationships between 
psychopathology, cognition, and linguistic and verbal 
behavior. The following section is not meant to be all 
inclusive but to point to areas of research previously 
examined in this area of linguistic behavior as it relates 
to so-called psychopathological conditions.
Vetter (1969), summarizing this area, cited the work 
of Southard (1916) who stated that standard grammatical 
categories may prove to be a more accurate and reliable 
method of diagnostic classification than existing ca­
tegories. Busemann (1925, cited by Vetter, 1969) developed what 
he called the Action Quotient (AQ) which he attempted to cor­
relate with ratings of emotional stability. White (1926, cited 
in Vetter, 1969) and Von Domarus (1925, cited in Vetter, 1969 ) 
did considerable examination of the language patterns of
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schizophrenics.
Eisenson (1932) was the first to attempt to classify 
"linguistic profiles" for manic depressive illness and 
schizophrenia. He was interested in a number of factors 
such as rate of speech, content, flow of speech, pitch, and 
levels of abstraction. He stated, "A disorder in the use of 
speech of any type or degree reveals a disorder in persona­
lity. " (p .166).
Newman and Mather (1938) attempted a highly sophisti­
cated analysis of language behavior in manic-depressive 
illness and demonstrated clear distinctions between three 
syndromes: classical depression; states of dissatisfaction, 
self-pity and gloom; and manic syndromes. They used sixteen 
categories of speech elements including articulation, pitch 
range, tempo, syntactic techniques, and style level.
Some of the earlier work that focused on syntactic 
elements of speech looked at verb-adjective ratios (Balken & 
Masserman, 1940; Fairbanks, 1944; Mann, 1944; Lorenz & Cobb, 
1953; Benton, Hartman & Sarason, 1955) and pronouns 
(Fairbanks, 1944; Mann, 1944; Goldman-Eisler, 1954; Conrad & 
Conrad, 1956).
Andreasen and Pfohl (1976) did a complex analysis of 
the speech of patients with affective disorders using 
elements of both syntax and content. Content analysis was 
done using the Type -Token Ratio, a measure of the richness 
or conventionality of vocabulary developed by Johnson 
(1944). Syntactic analysis was done by classifying words
into one of seven parts of speech with twenty-six 
subdivisions. Subjects were 31 inpatients classified as 
either manic (N = 16) or depressive (N = 15). Nine of the 
manic subjects and thirteen of the depressed subjects were 
female. Significant differences were found between the two 
groups. Depressed persons were classified as more vague but 
only in that they used more state of being rather than 
action verbs. Manics used more nouns in general, and, 
specifically, more concrete nouns. Depressives used more 
qualifiers and were therefore thought to be more tentative. 
Depressives also made more personal references. In the area 
of content analysis, manics expressed more concern with 
power and achievement, while depressives expressed more 
overstatement and generalization, a finding which would 
support at least one of Beck's hypotheses.
This study ranks as one of the most ambitious of the 
attempts to examine language behavior in the affective 
syndromes. However it is seriously flawed in a number of 
areas. First, there is no control group. Secondly, there 
was considerable diversity in the sample group in terms of 
age, educational level, and gender; all factors found by 
Cummings and Renshaw (1979) to effect linguistic usage.
These studies of language behavior and 
psychopathological conditions have all used both traditional 
grammatical variables and standard taxonomies of 
psychological conditions. However, some of the promise of 
using cognitive or cognitive-linguistic analysis is in 
discovering new ways of examining old issues.
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Sanford (1942) expressed many of the concerns of what
has become current psycholinguistics and specified what
would become one of the critical issues of analysing
language when he said:,
If the investigation of the linguistic side 
of personality is going to amount to a great 
deal, the problem of choosing and defining 
significant variables must be met and solved. 
Grammatical categories are available but they 
are not psychologically conceived and may not 
be of maximal use in the psychological study 
of language. ... Researchers have shown that 
the grammatical categories are useful in the 
study of speech. But there is no evidence 
that they are the most useful categories or 
that a better way of classifying linguistic 
phenomena cannot be found, (p. 831).
Sanford's criticism is a valid one. But it must be remem­
bered that the standard grammatical categories are them­
selves an artificial invention, designed for the classifica­
tion of language usage in a more philosophical light, and 
then refined to deal with the stylistic concerns of litera­
ture. If these grammatical categories can be adapted to 
psycholinguistic investigation, so much the better. If not, 
they at least serve as a beginning point of examination.
The analysis of the content of speech as it relates to 
people suffering from various pathological conditions has 
long been an area of intense interest. However, the number 
of thematic classifications for language content seems to be 
as large as the number of etiological theories used to 
explain a given psychological disorder and little in the way 
of consensus has been reached in this area. Among the most 
well known and extensively researched are the Content
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Analysis Scales developed by Gottschalk and Gleser (1969, 
1964). What their work implies is that at some point a 
complete diagnostic battery should include 1.) some form of 
a content analysis or thematic study 2.) the syntactic 
analysis as proposed in this study and 3.) some profile of 
the paralinguistic features, as well. These three areas 
would provide a fairly complete profile of cognition as 
assessed by linguistic means. However, such a comprehensive 
diagnostic battery, while one of the ultimate goals of this 
researcher, is a number of years away and would require 
significant advances or standardization in the measurement 
of paralinguistic features; topics that are outside the 
scope of the present study.
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APPENDIX D.
DEPRESSION: DESCRIPTION AND THEORIES
The history of the syndrome of depression is a long 
one. It has been discussed and recognized in all nations 
since ancient times. Since the time of Hippocrates and 
before, numerous explanations have been offered. The term, 
melancholy, is the result of one such explanation. In Greek 
melancholia means black bile, the bodily humour thought to 
be responsible for the affliction. Adolph Meyer in 1904 
first suggested the use of the term depression.
Today the descriptions and terminology used to define 
depression are varied and ambiguous although the proportion 
of the problem is not. Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery (1979), 
quoting a National Institute of Health report (Secunda,
Katz, Friedman & Schulyer; 1973), estimate that at least 
12% of the adult population have had or will have experi­
enced a depressive episode of sufficient magnitude to re­
quire treatment and that, during any year 15% of all adults 
suffer from significant depressive symptoms. In an earlier 
NIMH report, Williams, Friedman, and Secunda (1970) state 
that between four and eight million Americans are in need of 
professional care for their depressive illnesses. It must be 
emphasized that the costs of depression are not measured in 
terms of suffering or painful emotion alone. Williams, et. 
al., further state that one of every two hundred persons
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affected by a depressive illness will die by suicide.
Solomon and Patch (1971) reported that for the year 1968 
there were 21,372 suicides in the United States. Schneidman, 
Farberow and Litman (1970) stated that approximately 22,000 
people commit suicide each year and that this estimate is 
likely to be low because of the difficulty in determining 
intent in many accidental deaths. Williams et al. 
further estimated that the financial consequences of depres­
sion, in terms of treatment costs and lost productivity are 
between 1.3 and 4.0 billion dollars annually.
Definitions of Depression
Depression is clearly a problem of epidemic proportions 
but what is depression? The problem of defining and catego­
rizing depression is a complex one. Boyd and Levis (1980) 
stated "Currently used categories have classified this syn­
drome according to whether the eliciting stimulus is inter­
nal or external (endogenous vs. exogenous), the nature of 
the response pattern ( autonomous vs. reactive), the level 
of anxiety (agitated vs.' retarded), the occurrence of mood 
swings ( unipolar vs bipolar), and the level of reality 
testing (psychotic vs. neurotic). "
The specification of the symptoms of depression is no 
easier. Levitt and Lubin (1975) concluded that almost every 
symptom known to psychiatry has been included in the depres­
sive syndrome by some investigator. Akiskal and Mckinney 
(1975) stated, "The most common and most obvious symptoms of 
depression are what are commonly called depressive affects; 
grief, despair and guilt in varying degrees and combinations.
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Not only are these affects painful in themselves, they are 
also often associated with an inability to function normally 
or with self-injurious and even self-destructive tendencies." 
This description focuses on the affective element of 
depression. Indeed, depression is listed in the Diaqnotic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American 
Psychiatric Association (DSM-III-R, 1986) as an affective 
disorder. However the complete diagnostic criteria for 
depression list a number of non-affective symptoms, among 
them:
a) Insomnia or sleeping too much, (b)
Low energy level.or chronic tiredness.
(c) Feelings of inadequacy. (d)Decreased 
effectiveness or productivity at school, 
work or home, (e) Decreased attention, 
concentration or ability to think clear­
ly. (f) Social withdrawal, (g) Loss of 
interest in or enjoyment of sex. (h) Re­
striction of involvement in pleasurable 
activities or guilt over past activi­
ties. (i) Feeling of slowing down, (j)
Less talkative than usual, (k) Pessimis­
tic attitude toward the future or brood­
ing about past events. (1) Tearfulness 
or crying, (m) Recurrent thoughts of 
death or suicide, (p. 222)
These above criteria are in addition to the predomi­
nant affective state of sadness or guilt.
Theories of Depression
Just as the description of depression is diverse and 
varied, so are the theories that have been proposed to 
explain its causes. While the approaches suggested over the 
centuries have ranged from imbalanced bodily humours to loss 
of positive reinforcement, Akiskal and Mckinney (1975) have 
summarized 10 major contemporary viewpoints of depression.
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They have classified these viewpoints into five major 
schools of thought.
The first is termed the psychoanalytic school, although 
this term suggests a more limited definition of models than 
is actually included. A more apt term might be mediational 
models. Listed here are the retroflexed anger model identi­
fied by Abraham (1924, 1911, cited by Akiskal & McKinney, 1975), 
the object loss model identified by Rado (1928), Spitz (1946) 
and Bowlby (1960), the loss of self esteem model proposed by 
Bibring (1965, cited by Akiskal & McKinney, 1975), and the 
negative cognitive set or cognitive theory of Beck (1979, 1964, 
1963 ) .
The second school of thought proposed by Akiskal and 
Mckinney (1975) is identified as the behavioral approach. 
Included here are the learned helplessness model proposed by 
Seligman (1975) and the variants of the loss of reinforce­
ment model as proposed by Ferster (1973), Lewinsohn (1974) 
and Lazarus (1974).
The third main school of thought is termed the biologi­
cal approach. Included here is the biogenic amine or cate­
cholamine model suggested by Schildkraut (1965). Also in­
cluded under this approach are the conceptions of other 
researchers who suggest different neurophysiological proces­
ses as the cause of depression such as Coppen (1967) who 
views disturbances in the metabolism of potassium and sodium 
as a causal factor in depression and Rubin and Mandell 
(1966) who found an increased level of the cortical steroid,
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cortisol, in the brains of depressed patients.
The fourth main school of thought is termed the socio­
genic approach which includes only the sociogenic model 
proposed by Bart (1974, cited by Akiskal & McKinney, 1975).
Here, depression is thought to involve a loss of self-esteem 
that accompanies a loss or confusion of approved societal roles.
The last school of thought identified by Akiskal and 
McKinney is the existential model exemplified by Frankl 
(1969). In this model, depression is thought to result from 
a person's perceived loss of meaning or purpose in life.
The five categories identified by Akiskal and McKinney 
provide only one way of conceptualizing the psychological 
state of depression. Boyd and Levis (1980) divided the theo­
ries of depression into two major categories; (a) a non- 
behavioral approach, that includes both the biological and 
psychoanalytic views, or (b) a behavioral model, which in­
cludes the cognitive model identified by Beck, the learned 
helplessness model identified by Seligman (1975) and the 
reinforcement models of Ferster (1973), Lewinsohn (1974), 
and Lazarus (1968).
Boyd and Levis further subdivide the behavioral models 
into (a) the stimulus-response non-motivational models in­
cluding the work of Ferster, Lazarus, and Lewinsohn, (b) the 
stimulus-response motivational models which, include the 
theory of Stampfl and Levis (1967) that depression is the 
result of both loss of positive affect and the arousal of 
anxiety, (c) the stimulus-stimulus non-motivational models, 
which includes Seligman's learned helplessness model
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and (d) the stimulus-stimulus motivational models, of which 
the best example is Beck's (1979) cognitive model.
The categorization system of Boyd and Levis (1980) 
reflects their general behavioral orientation. Thus, their 
taxonomic system represents only a differing way of concep­
tualizing the process or entity of depression. An equally 
valid method of categorization might be to divide the theo­
ries into those where cognition is implicated in some form, 
including here the psychoanalytic, existential, sociological 
and cognitive, those involving biological or physiological 
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APPENDIX E.
DESCRIPTION OF SLCA-III VARIABLES
The following section describes in greater detail and 
explains the meaning of the classes and specific variables 
calculated by the SLCA-III program.
(A) social perception as assessed by measures of nouns 
and pronouns:
(a) inanimate perception - the relative frequency
of subjects and objects of verbs having "thing" 
quality rather than refering to "person"
(b) audience perception - the relative frequency 
of subjects and objects of verbs that are 
second person pronouns, either positive or ne­
gated
(c) self-perception - the relative frequency of 
subjects and objects of verbs which are first 
person personal pronouns, either positive or 
negated
(d) generalized-other perception - the relative 
frequency of nouns and personal pronouns 
referring to unspecified persons or groups such 
as "someone, anyone", positive and negated
(e) author itv-other perception - the relative 
frequency of proper nouns which refer to 
specific persons or groups, positive or negated
(B) measures of sensation assessed by measures of 
nouns, pronouns, and qualifiers:
(a) sensed information - the relative frequency 
of subjects and objects of verbs referring to 
persons, places or things that can be 
perceived by the senses (concrete)
(b) unsensed information - the relative frequency 




(c) sensed qualifiers - the relative frequency of 
adjectives, adverbs, and objects of 
prepositions which refer to qualities that 
can be perceived through the senses
(d) unsensed gualifiers - the relative frequency 
of modifiers that cannot be sensed
(C) measures of existence (affirmation or negation):
(a) negative information - the relative frequen­
cy of subjects or objects of verbs which have 
a negation or a prefix such as "un" or "dys"
(b) positive information - the relative frequen­
cy of subjects and objects of verbs that have 
no negation
(c) negative qualification - the relative fre­
quency of qualifiers associated with the 
words they modify by use of "no" or "not"
(d) positive qualification - the relative fre­
quency of qualifiers not associated with "no" 
or "not"
(e) negative relation - the relative frequency of 
verbs having "not" or certain negating pre­
fixes in the verb phrase
(f) pos itive relation - the relative frequency of
verbs which do not have negation in the verb
phrase
(D) measures of motion (state of being)
(a) non-motion language - the relative frequency
of verbs or verb phrases which are in the
form of "to be"
(b) motion language - the relative frequency of
all other verbs or verb phrases
(E) measures of disposition
(a) dispos ition language - the relative frequency 
of verbs that are in the subjunctive mood or
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in the form of a question
(b) assertion language - the relative frequency 
of verbs in the indicative mood
(F) measures of time
(a) past time - the relative frequency of simple 
past tense verbs or verb phrases
(b) present time - the relative frequency of
simple present tense verbs or verb phrases
(c) future time - the relative frequency of sim­
ple future tense verbs or verb phrases
(G) measures of reflexiveness
(a) symmetric relation - the relative frequency
of verbs or verb phrases that have an object
associated with them (transitive verbs)
(b) asymmetric relation - the relative frequency
of verbs or verb phrases that do not have an
object (intransitive verbs)
(H) measures of definitionality
(a) gualified information - the relative frequen­
cy of information units with one or more 
qualifiers
(b) ungualified information - the relative fre­
quency of information units without quali­
fiers
(c) gualified relation - the relative frequency 
of relations (verbs) with one or more 
qualifiers
(d) unqualified relation - the relative frequen­
cy of verbs or verb phrases without qualifi­
ers
The first class, social perception, refers to the pri­
mary focus of the individual's thoughts, whether to self, 
other persons, things, authority figures, etc.
The second class,sensation, deals with the nature of
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the cognitions. Are they tangible and concrete or are they 
abstract and ephemeral?
The third category deals with existence and can be 
thought of as the "point of reference" or attitude concer­
ning the nature of information. Thus, this category is 
concerned with whether the individual perceives the world by 
way of positive affirmation or whether the existence of 
things is affirmed by negation.
The fourth class is termed motion, but, more precisely, 
it is concerned with the state of being or the state of 
function of relations (verbs). The cognitive nuances that 
are encoded in either the form "I am courageous" vs. "I 
act courageously" might be discovered to have significant 
implications for the study of cognition.
The fifth category is termed disposition and is a 
measure of the speculative or confident nature of the lan­
guage used. Conversely, it is also a measure of potentiality 
or possibility used in language. The subjunctive mood is 
used to express contingent or hypothetical propositions and 
is indicated by such words as "may" or "might". Cummings 
and Renshaw suggest that this category relates to the user's 
perception of what is unreal or what is fact. It might 
further assess the level of confidence of the user.
The sixth category is concerned with time and is of 
considerable importance because of the place that references 
to past and future times have in many theories of disordered 
behavior. The seventh category is termed reflexiveness and
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it essentially involves measures of intransitive vs. 
transitive verbs. The use of intransitive verbs is likely to 
yield measures of the use of the passive voice which is often 
associated with a victim orientation. Finally, the eighth 
category is termed definitionality and may also be seen as a 
measure of confidence or certainty in communication. This 
category measures the degree to which information units and 
relations are modified or qualified.
APPENDIX F.
SLCA MANUAL 
GUIDE TO SLCA III
INTRODUCTION
SLCA III consists of four parts:
1. the ANALYZE program
2. the NUMBERS program
3. a set of dictionaries used by ANALYZE
4. the DMERGE program used to maintain the dictionaries
ANALYZE reads in the SLCA dictionaries and textual 
data (messages). By dictionary lookup and positional 
analysis it produces data for input to the NUMBERS program.
NUMBERS reads the "augmented data" produced by 
ANALYZE. For each message a one-page report is printed 
giving the message id, the perceptual-cognitive activity
(PCA) and the thirty-five densities NUMBERS has calculated.
Optionally, NUMBERS punches the reported information for 
each message. This requires six cards per message.
DMERGE can create new dictionaries from old ones.
The format of dictionaries will be discussed later.
USING THE ANALYZE PROGRAM 
INPUT DATA FOR ANALYZE
The input data for ANALYZE consists of one or more 
"messages." The first card of each message is used for 
identification. Begin punching the message text on the next 
card. Skip one or more blank spaces between each word.
You may punch data out to col 80 if you wish. It is best, 
however to punch stuff out to about col 65 leaving 73-80 
for sequence numbers. It saves a lot of trouble if you 
don't split words across card boundaries. (See $MARGIN 
option.) At the end of each message punch a slash (/).
This may or may not be on a new card.
GENERAL RULES FOR CODING MESSAGES
1. Do not punch hyphens (except in verbs; see next 
rule), apostrophes, plus signs (except for nouns 
and pronouns), colons or quotes within messages.
2. Code each verb with a hyphen (-) at the first of
the word (e.g. -ARE). Connect the words making 
up a verb phrase with hyphens.
+1 WANT-TO-TAKE A +VACATION.
An exception to this: if a Non-Action verb occurs
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within the verb phrase then break the phrase at that point. 
For instance:
+1 WILL-BE -STAYING AT THE +RITZ.
3. Tag all nouns and pronouns with a plus (+) at the 
front of each word (e.g. +GIFT, +1). Tag a 
specific person or group with two plus signs (++), 
like:
++REGINALD OF THE ++ASPCA -IS HERE.
4. If necessary, relocate prepositional phrases so 
that they occur in the sentence after and as 
close as possible to the noun or verb which is 
being modified by the preposition. For instance:
given: Up the hill he ran quickly, 
code: +HE -RAN QUICKLY UP THE +HILL.
5. Code numbers (two, say) in numeric form (2) unless 
it is being used as a subject or object. In those 
cases, spell out the number (e.g. +ONE WILL-BE 
SUFFICIENT).
6. If a word has a negative prefix remove it and code 
the word "NOT" in front of the word. For example:
for "unlimited" code NOT LIMITED
for "illegal" code NOT LEGAL
7. Break down contractions:
for "won't" code NOT -WILL 
for "you're" code +YOU -ARE
8. NOTE: ANALYZE considers a word to be negated if
and only if it is immediately preceded by either 
NO or NOT.
OUTPUT FROM ANALYZE
NO. TAGS WORD FUNC TYPE
A B C D R S T
1.01 A + U S ++JACK IU
1.02 AND OTH
1.03 A + U S ++JILL IU
1.04 P + D NT ND AC -WENT RL
1.05 UP PREP
1.06 THE OTH
1.07 + R N + HILL PEND QQ
1.08 R + D TR ND AC TO-FETCH RL
1.09 A OTH
1.10 I + D N + PAIL IU
1.11 OF PREP
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1.12 + I S +WATER PEND QQ
Figure 1: sample output
NO. This is a number generated in the following
way: the part left of the decimal point is
the clause number within the input text. The 
part to the right is the number of the word 
within the clause. Thus each word input to 
ANALYZE will get a unique number.
TAGS The TAGS are subdivided into seven "posi­
tions." These are called A,B,C,D,R,S and T. 
Positions A,B,C and D can have a one charac­
ter value. Positions R,S and T can have a 
two character value. None of the three TYPEs 
use all seven positions. Only words of type 
IU,QQ or R1 get TAGs at all.
WORD Just the word again, unchanged from the way
it was typed in.
FUNC Used by ANALYZE in positional analysis.
There are four different values for this:
1. OTH means the word was found in the 
OTH diet.
2. NEG means the word is either NO or 
NOT.
3. PREP means the word was in the PREP 
diet. and also that ANALYZE was 
able to find an object fot it.
4. PEND the object of a PREP. PENDs 
automatically are TYPE QQ.
TYPE 1. IU - Information Unit. Nouns, pro­
nouns .
2. QQ - Qualitative-Quantitative word. 
Adverbs, adjectives, objects of 
prepositions.
3. RL - Relational word. Verbs, verb 
phrases.
With the exception of PEND, any word that gets assigned 
a FUNC is not assigned a TYPE. The following Tables will be 
helpful in figuring out what the TAGS for a word mean. 
There is a different Table for each of the three TYPEs.
Table 1 
TAGS for IU TYPE
POSI­ sub­ value class dictionary
TION script
A ( 1 ) "A" Authority other -
( 2 ) "G" General other (GO)
(3) "S" Self (SELF)
(4) it ip  ii Audience (AUD)
(5) ii j  ii Inanimate -
B ( 1 ) it +  ii positive (IU) -
( 2 ) ii _  ii negated (IU) -
C ( 1 ) "D" Defined (IU) -
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(2) "U" Undefined (IU)
D (1) "S" Sensory (IU) (SENSE)
(2) "N" Non-sensory (IU)
R /S /T -unused-
Table 2 
TAGS for QQ TYPE 
POSI- sub- value class dictionar
TION script
B ( 1 ) tl .J. I* positive (QQ) -
( 2 ) II _  II negated (QQ) -
C (1) II J  II qualifier of IU -
( 2 ) "R" qualifier of RL -
D ( 1 ) "S" Sensory (QQ) (SENSE
( 2 ) "N" Non-sensory (QQ) -
R, s , T -unused1-
Table 3
TAGS for RL TYPE
POSI­ sub­ value class dictionary
TION script
A (1) l i p  H Past tense (PASTC)
(2) "R" Present tense -
(3) u p  ii Future tense (FUTRC)
B (1) ii +  ii positive (RL) -
(2) ii _  ii negated (RL) -
C (1) "D" defined (RL) -
(2) " U" undefined (RL) -
D -unused-
R (1) "TR" TRansitive -
(2) || NT ii iNTransitive -
S (1) "SU" Subjunctive -
(2) "ND" iNDicative -
T (1) "AC" Action -
(2) "NA" Non-Action -
Figure 1 is some sample output from ANALYZE. Let's go 
through some of it.
Notice that for ++JACK the TAG in position A is "A". In 
position B there is a "C". The TAG in position C is "U" and 
in position D the TAG is "S". Using Table 1 it can be seen 
that ++JACK was classified Authority-other, positive, Unde­
fined and Sensory.
AND didn't get any TAGS because it wasn't found to be of 
type IU, QQ or R L .
-WENT has TAGS "P + D NT ND AC". This translates to: 
Past tense, positive, Defined, iNTransitive, iNDicative and 
Action (see Table 3 ).
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+HILL has been classified positive, modifier of an "RL" 
(this came about because +HILL was the object of a preposi­
tion which occured after an "RL" word), and Non-sensory.
+HILL was classified Non-sensory. +HILL should have been 
classified Sensory. Evidently HILL wasn't present in the 
dictionary of sensory words (SENSE). We will probably want 
to add HILL to SENSE. This does not mean we have to run AN­
ALYZE again, however. If the PUN option was enabled then 
ANALYZE produced a data set containing all that info in Fig­
ure 1. This data is fed to the NUMBERS program. Before we 
hand over this data to NUMBERS we can use a text editor to 
fix mistakes like the one just noted. Let us assume that 
$PUN=1 and ANALYZE has written the augmented data into a 
data set called "phase2.data." Figure 2 below is an example 
of how one could fix the error using QED:




1.07 + R N +HILL
change /N/S/
1.07 + R S +HILL
save 
SAVED
Figure 2: Fixing a mistake made by ANALYZE
Now when the NUMBERS program reads phase2.data it will 
take +HILL as being Sensory. Once again we'd like to stress 
that there is nothing sacred about the decisions made by AN­
ALYZE and that no frequency counts are maintained by ANA­
LYZE. The NUMBERS program accumulates frequencies of all 
the different TAG combinations that occur. These are held 
in three multi-dimensional arrays:
1. IU(5,2,2,2)
2. Q Q (2,2,2)
3. R L (3,2,2,2,2,2)
Look again at Table 2. The TAGs we decided on for +HILL are 
"+ R S". These have the associated subscripts 1,2,1. What 
this means is that the NUMBERS program increments the array 
element QQ(1,2,1) by 1 when it processes the card changed in 
Figure 2.
LIST OF OPTIONS FOR ANALYZE PROGRAM
$PUN=1 Requests ANALYZE to output the augmented data
needed by ACCUM. This will be written to 
file PUNCH.
$PUN=Q Suppress output of augmented data.
(default)
$CHECKD=1 Requests ANALYZE to print the "header card"
(default)
from each of the eight dictionaries. This 












Tells ANALYZE to scan only the first 72 co­
lumns of the input text. This leaves columns 
73 through 80 for sequence numbers. You may 
set $MARGIN equal to any integral value 
greater than zero and less than or equal to 
80.
Tells ANALYZE to print the words it has det­
ermined to be NON-SENSORY twice. Once in the 
column with all the other words and again in 
a separate column under the heading:
"ARE YOU SURE THESE WORDS ARE NON-SENSORY?" 
Suppress USURE option. Note that the USURE 
option only affects the printed listing (file 
SYSPRINT) and has no effect on the augmented 
data produced by ANALYZE (file PUNCH).
SPECIFYING OPTIONS FOR ANALYZE PROGRAM
Options for all three programs in SLCA III (ANALYZE, NUM­
BERS and DMERGE) are handled in the same general way. That 
is, the selected options are passed as a string of charac­
ters to the executing program by the operating system. The 
string itself consists of one or more assignment statements 
separated by commas. The order of the assignments within 
the string is unimportant. Some examples:
// EXEC PGM=ANALYZE,PARM='$PUN = 1, SCHECKD = O'
Or, you might let the options default:
// EXEC PGM=ANALYZE
FILE USAGE IN ANALYZE PROGRAM
The ANALYZE program reads text messages form file SYSIN.
It writes a report to file SYSPRINT and punches augmented 
data to file PUNCH. It reads in the dictionaries from file 
INPUTD.
USING THE NUMBERS PROGRAM
HOW NUMBERS INTERPRETS THE AUGMENTED DATA
ANALYZE punches out the augmented data in the following 
format:
1. Message id, cols 1-80
2. A bunch of "data lines," one for each word and 
mark of punctuation in the original message.
3. End of message indicator, (a slash in col 1). 
Items 1. through 3. are produced for each message in the or­
iginal data.
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NUMBERS handles each data line as follows: 
col. 1 ANALYZE outputs a card with a slash (/) in
column 1 to signal the end of each message to 
NUMBERS. NUMBERS checks each card for this 
slash and upon finding it, begins summing up 
the accumulated frequencies and prints a one 
page report. Optionally, NUMBERS punches 
output for the message at this point. The 
next message id is read.
cols 56-57 If these are blank, NUMBERS ignores the card
completely. If these columns contain letters 
other than 'IU1, 'QQ' or 'RL' then a warning 
is issued and the card is ignored.
cols 14-29 The TAG info in these columns is translated
into subscripts used for incrementing the
correct element of the appropriate frequency 
accumulator array.
The ANALYZE program produces (and the NUMBERS program ex­
pects) data arranged according to the above format. When
you make changes in the data produced by ANALYZE, you must 
be careful not to change the position of the TYPE or TAG
info. If you move something out of place, NUMBERS will let
you know.
LIST OF OPTIONS FOR NUMBERS PROGRAM
$PUN=1 Requests NUMBERS to punch the message id
card, the PCA and the thirty-five densities. 
$PUN=0 Suppress PUN option.
(default)
$LC=66 Number of lines per page for the printed out-
(default) put.
PASSING OPTIONS TO NUMBERS PROGRAM
This is done in exactly the same way as for the ANALYZE 
program. That is, a string of one or more assignment state­
ments separated by commas and enclosed in apostrophes is 
passed to the program by the system. Like:
// EXEC PGM=NUMBERS,PARM='$PUN = 1'
or, you can omit the parm string and get the default op­
tions :
// EXEC PGM=NUMBERS
FILE USAGE IN NUMBERS PROGRAM
The NUMBERS program reads the augmented data from file 
SYSIN. It writes error and warning messages to file MESS.
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Reports are printed on file SYSPRINT. Card output is writ­
ten to file PUNCH. A "DD Statement” or ”TSO FILE ALLOC" 
will have to be provided for each of these files at run 
t ime.
DICTIONARIES IN SLCA III 
FORMATTING OF SLCA DICTIONARIES












When ANALYZE reads in a 
pares the first eight 
header against an internal label to see if it 
is really the dictionary it wanted. Columns 
9-80 of the header are disregarded and may be 
used for further identification.
An integer right justified to column 10 of 
the next card.
The words are enclosed in single quotes and 
are separated from each other by one or more 
blanks. This is to be suitable for PL/I 
"list directed" input, and in practice is 
usually created by PL/I list directed output, 
program expects eight of these dictionaries, 
in the following order:
OTH, GO, SELF, AUD, PREP, PASTC, FUTRC, SENSE.
CONTENTS OF DICTIONARIES
There are eight SLCA dictionaries:
1. OTH - words that are to be excluded from analysis 
(UH, MAYBE, etc.).
2. GO - the General-Other dictionary contains words 
that refer to other (non-specific) people (+THEY, 
+EVERYONE, etc.).
3. SELF - words that refer back to the speaker (+1, 
+WE, etc.).
4. AUD - audience. References to the person being 
spoken to (+YOU, etc.).
5. PREP - Prepositions (INTO, OVER, BEYOND, etc.). 
Note that if ANALYZE can't find an object for the 
preposition it TYPEs the preposition as QQ.
6. PASTC - Past tense verbs. If a verb or verb phrase 
in the input data contains something from PASTC as 
a substring that verb gets tagged past tense.
7. FUTRC - Future tense verbs. Same as PASTC but the 
tense is future.
8. SENSE - Sensory words. Nouns or verbs stored with 
no plus in front. Don't include words from any of 
the other dictionaries in this one.
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USING THE DMERGE PROGRAM
DMERGE is the dictionary maintenance program for SLCA 
III. With it, one can create new dictionaries. DMERGE al­
ways needs one old dictionary (read through file DICT). 
DMERGE also reads input from file SYSIN. This might be 
another SLCA dictionary. DMERGE uses a work file (filename: 
TOUT) and writes the new dictionary to file NDIC. "DD 
Statements" (or "TSO FILE ALLOC's if you are running fore­
ground) must be supplied for each of the files mentioned.




Add or Delete. Input:
An old dictionary through file 
DICT.
A set of cards
space or a
each with a blank 
in the first column
and one word enclosed in single 
quotes.
If col 1 was blank the word on the card will 
appear in the new dictionary. If col 1 was a 
"D" the word will not be copied to the new 
dictionary.







dictionary through file DICT. But here, the 
input is the new word to be added to the dic­
tionary. This includes the header card and 
word count and everything as described in the 
dictionary format section. A word will ap­
pear in the new dictionary if it appears in 
either one of the input dictionaries.
Delete all. Input is same as for $MERGE=1 
(i.e. two old dictionaries, one to file DICT 
and one to file SYSIN). A word will appear 
in the new dictionary if it appears in the 
file DICT dictionary and does not appear in 
the file SYSIN dictionary.
Requests DMERGE to issue a warning message 
whenever you try to add a word that is al­
ready in the file or delete a word not in the 
file. It is a good idea to let these mes­
sages be printed when you have chosen 
$MERGE=0.
Suppress messages described for $MESS=1. You 
may want $MESS=0 for $MERGE=1 or 2.
These options help control the amount of me­
mory required by DMERGE. The dictionary read 
in through file DICT is not stored in memory 
in its entirety. However, all the stuff read 
in from file SYSIN (no matter which merge op­
tion you pick) IS. The value for SNUMWDS had 
better be greater than or equal to the number
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of words in the SYSIN file.
$SIZEW had better be set to a value 
greater than or equal to the number of char­
acters in any of the words in EITHER of the 
two input files.
The default values are: $SIZEW=40,
$NUMWDS=1800.
SPECIFYING OPTIONS FOR DMERGE
As with the ANALYZE and NUMBERS programs, options are 
passed as a character string to DMERGE by the operating sys­
tem. The string consists of one or more "assignment state­
ments" separated by commas and enclosed in single quotes.
Example:
// EXEC PGM=DMERGE,PARM='$MERGE = 1, $MESS = 1'
Or, omit the string and settle for the defaults:
// EXEC PGM=DMERGE
PLEASE NOTE
Copyrighted materials in this document have 
not been filmed at the request of the author 
They are available for consultation, however 





DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY 
BATON ROUGE, LA. 70803-5501 
(504) 388-8745
Consent Form
This study is a comparision of speech patterns with 
elements of cognition and thought. You will be asked to 
respond to specified stimuli by speaking into a tape 
recorder. The speech will be analyzed by computer and 
comparisons will be made according to some of the 
information on the forms you will be filling out.
Your participation in this study is voluntary and you 
may withdraw at any time. All responses will be anonymous 
and at no time will any record of your full name be kept 
except on this consent form which will not be kept with the 
data samples. While your first name and last four digits of 
your student number will be used in the first part of the 
study, final samples will be compared using only an unre­
lated subject number and the name and student # information 
will be destroyed.
There is one other request, that you not discuss the 
study or the stimuli with friends or others who might be 
participating in the study until the data collection is 
complete and they have given their samples of speech.
Should you choose to participate in this study, please 
sign below.
__________ I agree to participate in this study and not dis­






First Name:____________________________ Last Initial:
Telephone:________________ Last 4 Nos. of Soc. Sec
Age:____________  Year in School__________________
Race:______________ Is English your Native Languag
Estimate of Yearly Total Family Income: (Parents) 
(check one only, please)
  $ 13,000 or under
_____  $ 13,000 to $21,000
_____  $ 21,000 to $30,000
  $ 30,000 to $40,000
_____  $ 40,000 to $60,000




This section contains all of the various stimuli used 




This is a study of speaking and conversational habits. When 
you are ready I would like you to speak for approximately 
five minutes about any interesting or dramatic personal life 
experiences of a positive nature you may have had. When you 
are ready you may begin.
Stimulus One 
Negative
This is a study of speaking and conversational habits. When 
you are ready I would like for you to speak for 
approximately five minutes about your most embarassing or 




This is a study of speaking and conversational habits. When 
you are ready I would like you to speak for approximately 
five minutes, giving your thoughts as to why a free press is 





This time I would like you to speak for approximately five 
minutes about any interesting or dramatic personal life 
experiences of a positive nature you may have had. When you 
are ready you may begin.
Stimulus Two 
Negative
This time I would like you to speak for approximately five 
minutes about your most embarassing or most negative 
personal life experiences. When you are ready you may begin.
Stimulus Two 
Opinion
This time I would like you to speak for approximately five 
minutes giving some of your thoughts as to why a free press 




This time I would like you to speak for approximately five 
minutes about any interesting or dramatic personal life 
experiences of a positive nature you may have had. When you 
have completed this item, you are finished and may return to
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the experimenter. Thank you for your participation. When 
you are ready you may begin.
Stimulus Three 
Negative
This time I would like you to speak for approximately five 
minutes about your most embarassing or most negative 
personal life experiences. When you have completed this 
item, you are finished and may return to the experimenter. 




This time I would like for you to speak for approximately 
five minutes, giving your thoughts as to why a free press is 
important in a democracy. When you have completed this item, 
you are finished and may return to the experimenter. Thank 




This section contains the instruction set given to all 
subjects.
Instructions
Inside this envelope are three smaller envelopes each 
containing one stimuli for you to respond to. The envelopes 
are numbered one, two and three. Please open them only in 
the correct order and open the second only after you have 
responded to the first, and open the third only after you 
have responded to the second.
For each item I would like you to speak for approxi­
mately 3 to 5 minutes, giving your thoughts or telling 
about the topic. This is not a study of speech making or 
public speaking so please do not stop the tape or re-record 
if you make mistakes, just keep going.
Before you begin speaking on each item please identify 
the item according to the stimulus number and the one word 
underneath. For example you might say " Stimulus One, 
Opinion". Do this at the start of each item. This will help 
me transcribe the items. When you are ready you may open 
the first item and begin.
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